Snell (1971). In his article Snell argued that annual model change in the auto industry constitutes an unfair trade practice, on the grounds that the yearly costs of retooling work as a barrier to market entry.80 On Snell’s estimate, in 1969 alone the “Big Three” auto manufacturers (GM, Ford, and Chrysler) spent \$1.5 billion to change their tooling in order to produce new models. At the same time, Snell noted, the Bureau of Labor Statistics “reported a new reduction in performance improvements of \$3 per 1969 automobile.” The conclusion Snell drew from these figures was that the big three spent more than a billion and a half dollars to make their 1969 models seem “new and diferent” in appearance. In the process, they erected nigh impenetrable barriers to market entry: “In 1970, it would cost a company \$779 million to enter the automobile industry. The costs of annual style change capability, it is estimated, account for fully \$724 million, or more than 90 percent of this figure” (Snell 1971, p. 588). Snell further argued that the efect of planned obsolescence was to stifle “real” product improvements, by substituting superficial changes in design for genuine innovation. Snell’s analysis is worth quoting at length, both because it proved quite influential and because Snell makes a connection not usually explicitly made between style and material obsolescence:
It has been noted that the innovative characteristics of the industry began to decline shortly after annual restyling was introduced in the 1920s . . . by introducing a ‘new’ model each year, they provide the illusion of progress, and yet avoid the necessity of adopting technological improvements which would lower maintenance or initial purchase cost. It has been argued, for instance, that application of known metallurgical processes would permit doubling the life of an automobile for an additional cost of \$36 per year. . . . These developments, however, would increase automobile durability and thereby reduce demand, price and profits on new car sales. It is suspected therefore, that the Big Three have repressed these cost-savings while ofering consumers instead an annual restyling policy designed to bolster replacement demand through planned obsolescence. (Snell 1971, p. 59)
On Snell’s reasoning, then, durability was sacrificed on the altar of style— not style as an independent source of utility, but rather style as a false sign of material progress, a substitute for the real thing. In this way, so the argument went, consumers are duped into buying new models, perhaps on the mistaken assumption that stylistic flourishes such as tail fins index substantive, functional improvements—and therein lies a deception. Ralph Nader joined Snell and the editors of the Yale Law Journal in petitioning the FTC to launch an investigation into planned obsolescence, and the FTC agreed to look into the matter. Significantly, the FTC, in responding to Snell and Nader’s petition, made a distinction between material and style obsolescence. While evidence of material obsolescence was held to be actionable, style obsolescence was deemed to be an issue of taste and, therefore, not a proper matter for regulative intervention. Ultimately, however, nothing came of the FTC’s investigation, because no evidence of intentional material obsolescence could be found.
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Time for Things