Manuel Castells and Gustavo Cardoso (eds), The Network Society (Baltimore, Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006), p9.
21 Bill Dunn, Global Restructuring and the Power of Labour (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p118.
22 Kate Bronfenbrenner, "Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organising", The ILR Collection, 2001, available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article = 1001 &context= reports
23 Raymond-Pierre Bodin, Wideranging Forms of Work and Employment in Europe, International Labour Office report 2001.
24 As above.
25 Robert Taylor, "Britain's World of Work: Myths and Realities'', ESRC Future of Work Programme Seminar Series, 2002, available at http://www.esrc.ac. uk/ESR ClnfoCentre/Images/fow \_publication\_3\_tcm6- 6057. pdf
26 These figures are from the Office for National Statistics' Social Trends 2001, p88. Kevin Doogan, New Capitalism? The Transformation of Work (Cambridge UK, Polity, 2008) provides a similar picture to these figures.
27 These are very rough calculations, given the problems of counting the number of workers in the often massive sectors of national economies. But Filmer's figures, those of UNDP and those of the CIA all suggest a pattern similar to this.
28 All figures are for 2005, from UNDP, Human Development Report 2009, Table 5.
29 A failure to see this leads some to vastly exaggerate the growth of the working class that has resulted from globalisation and urbanisation. So in a much quoted paper, Richard Freeman has written of an "effective doubling of the global labour force (that is workers producing for international markets) over the past decade and a half, through the entry of Chinese, Indian, Russian and other workers into the global economy". This has supposedly changed the "global capital/labour ratio by just 55 percent to 60 percent of what it otherwise would have been". There is a triple error here. It assumes that those labouring in the former USSR, China and India were not doing so as part of the world system until the early 1 990s, and that their whole workforces are now workers employed by capital. There is, however, a big difference between the workforce in its totality and those who are wage workers. In 2001 the non-agricultural workforce of the developing and transition economies was 1, 1 35 million (figures from Summary of Food and Agricultural Statistics, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Rome 2003, p12). But by no means all the non-agricultural workforce workers. Self-employment as a proportion of the non-agricultural workforce is 32 percent in Asia, 44 percent in Latin America and 48 percent in Africa (Women and Men in the Informal Economy, International Labour Organization, 2002). And only a proportion of those who seek work as wage workers succeed in getting employed in the formal sector in modern industry. Most are in very low productivity jobs, often working for firms with only a couple of workers.
30 International Labour Office, African Employment Report 1 990 (Addis Ababa, 1991), p3.
31 International Labour Ofice, Women and Men in the Informal Economy, 2002.
32 See Chapter Nine for details; see also Ray Brooks, "Labour Market Performance and Prospects", in Eswar Prasad (ed) China's Growth and
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