vi. This, incidentally, is the way in which Lev Manovich interprets the phenomenon of digitization generally. See Manovich, 2000, Chapter 1.
vii. Bernard Stiegler is the thinker of the technical element of the sensible-transcendental and of the invagination of the empirical and the transcendental in the wake of technics. See Stiegler, 1998.
viii. Stiegler's critical reading of Leroi-Gourhan's empiricism engages the difficulties generated by such a concept of the origin. See Stiegler 1998, Part I, Chapter 3.
ix. It is not incidental that Lacan's analysis of the gaze, of object a as the gaze, identified radio and television as institutional supports for the gaze.
x. Ruyer's subjectivities form a complement to Leibniz's "little perceptions." I discuss Ruyer at length in New Philosophy for New Media, Chapter 5.
xi. Commenting on the concept of "reversed epiphenomenalism," Michel Piclin clarifies Ruyer's perspective:
The duality of the body and the spirit is illusory, Ruyer tells us, because our relation to the body is not of the order of having, but of the order of being: we do not have a body, we are an organism. The body is the organism seen by others; ... the organism, the body felt from within" (Piclin 1992, 161x).
xii. This priority can be seen clearly in the complexity of the observation (description) of an autopoietic organism (phenomenological unity):
Since it is a defining feature of an autopoietic system that it should specify its own boundaries, a proper recognition of an autopoietic system as a unity requires that the observer perform an operation of distinction that defines the limits of the system in the same domain in which it specifies them through its autopoiesis. If this is not the case, he does not observe the autopoietic system as a unity .. (Maturana and Varela 1980, 109).
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