xxvii. It is also for this reason that the visual can be determined as a derivative mode of sensation (as indeed touch can be, in distinction from primary tactility):
Our images are predominantly visual, and this is no accident; it is by means of vision that one can sufficiently dominate and control objects. With the visual experience of the self, there is thus the advent of a new mode of relatedness to self. The visual makes possible a kind of schism between the immediate me and the me that can be seen in the mirror. The sensory functions themselves are thus redefined in proportion to the contribution they can make to the existence of the subject and the structures they can offer for the development of that existence. (1964, 138)
Obviously, this "schism" must not be identified with the primary schism of being, even if it represents its derivative or, to recall Lingis' term, its emanation.
xxviii. See Bernard Stiegler, "Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and the Prosthesis of Faith.
xxix. Following the important, indeed ground-breaking concept of Bernard Stiegler (1998, Part I, Chapter 3).
xxx. According to Anzieu,
Tausk showed particularly well that the syndrome of the “influencing machine" could only be understood by distinguishing between these two Egos: the psychical Ego continues to be recognized by the subject as his own, ... whilst the bodily Ego is not recognized by the subject as belonging to itself and the cutaneous and sexual sensations which emanate from it are attributed to the workings of an influencing machine in the service of a devious seducer/persecutor. (40)
xxxi. More generally, Anzieu helps us see why Bick's work, like his own, necessarily entails an analysis of technics. However, Anzieu does not recognize the depth of the technical element and thus is not responsible for the discovery of the essential technicity of the skin.
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