In fact, without the violence of speed, that of weapons would not be so fearsome. In the current context, to disarm would thus mean first and foremost to decelerate, to defuse the race toward the end. Any treaty that does not limit the speed of this race (the speed of means of communicating destruction) will not lim it strategic arms, since from now on the essential object of strategy consists in maintaining the non-place of a general delocalization of means that alone stiH allows us to gain fractions of seconds, which gain is indispensable"to any freedom of action. As General Fuller wrote, "When the combatants threw j avelins at each other, the weapon's initial speed was such that one could see it on its traj ecto ry and parry its efects with one's shield. But when the j avelin was replaced by the bullet, the speed was so great that parry became impossible. " Impossible to move one's body out of the way, but possible if one moved out of the weapon's range; possible as well through the shelter of the trench, greater than that of the shield-possible, in other words, through space and matter.
Today, the reduction of warning time that results from the supersonic speeds of assault leav:es so little time for detection, identification and response that in the case of a surprise attack the supreme authority would have to risk abandoning his supremacy of decision by authorizing the lowest echelon of the defense system to immediately launch anti-missile missiles. The two political superpowers have thus far preferred to avoid this situation through negotiations, renouncing anti-missile defense at the same time.
Given the lack of space, an active defense requires at least the material time to intervene. But these are the "war materials" that disappear in the acceleration of the means of communicating destruction. There remains only a passive defense that consists less in reinforcing itself against the megaton powers of nuclear weapons than in a series of constant, unpredictable, aberrant movements, movements which are thus strategically efectivefor at least a little while lo nger, we hope. In fact, war now rests entirely on the deregulation of time and space. This is why the technical maneuver that consists in complexifying the vecto r by constantly imp roving its performances has now to tally supplanted tactical maneuvers on the terrain, as we have seen. General Ailleret points this out in his history of weapons by stating that the definition of arms programs has become one of the essential elements of strategy. If in ancient conventional warfare we could still talk about army maneuvers in the fields, in the cu rrent state of affairs , if this maneuver s till exists, it no longer needs a "field. " The invasion of the instant succeeds the invasion of the territory. The countdown becomes the scene of battle, the final frontier.
The State of Emergency
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