The threat of their performance at the moment of their invention, of their production;
The threat of their use against the enemy;
The efect of their use, which is fatal for persons and destructive for their goods.
If these last two components are unfortunately known, and have long been experimented with, the first, on the other hand, the (logistical) il omen of the invention of their performance, is less commonly recognized. Nonetheless, it is at this level that the question of deterrence is raised. Can we deter an enemy from inventing new weapons, or from perfecting their performances? Absolutely not.
We thus find ourselves facing this dilemma:
The threat of use (the second component) of the nuclear arm prohibits the terror of actual use (the third component) . But fo r this threat to remain and allow the strategy of deterrence, we are forced to develop the threatening system that characterizes the first component: the il omen of the appearance of new performances for the means of communicating destruction. Stated plainly, this is the perpetual sophistication of combat means and the replacement of the geostrategic breakthrough by the technological breakthrough, the great logistical maneuvers.
We must face the facts: if ancient weapons deterred us from interrupting movement, the new weapons deter us from interrupting the arms race. Moreover, they require in their technological (dromological) logic the exponential development, not of the number of destructive machines, since their power has increased (simply compare the millions of projectiles in the two World Wars to the several thousands of rockets in contemporary arsenals) , but of their global performances. Destructive capabilities having reached the very limits of possibility with thermonuclear arms, the enemy's "logistical strategies" are once more oriented toward power of penetration and flexibility of use.
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I Speed and Politics