萨特在《批判》中对总体化的论述得益于海德格尔在《存在与时间》中对“走向死亡的存在”的分析。特别是，此在作为整体的能力将其结构为存在分析的方式直接影响了萨特对个人实践作为总体化和“整体”的本体论基础的理解。155如前所述，海德格尔和萨特的总体化都应该被理解为一种持续的统一，其统一是其分化的过程，而不是，如Mészáros所读萨特，作为一个过程，“数以百万计的个人行动”(这是萨特的表达)“在历史必然性的适当意义上，加起来形成一个类似法律的决定网络”。156总体化运动必然是持续进行的这一事实包含了它的“基本特征”。157这一运动不仅是区分总体化与学院派的(静态的)总体概念的基础。158它还表明，总体总是“去总体化的总体”，也就是说，它们的存在取决于(1)与自身生产过程(总体化)分离，因此(2)一种统一一—一种“将其各部分结合在一起的主动力量”——与想象的行为相关。159换句话说，只有总体化，而不是总体，才是“物质统一”的本体论基础，即使，正如我们将学到的，这种统一是通过“在工具或机器的被动统一中聚集在一起的物质力量”强加给人类行为的，而这些力量本身“执行行动”。160.总体化和总体之间的关系使萨特的“进步-倒退”方法(正如在《批判》的序言文章《寻找方法》中概述的那样),以及构成《批判》系统逻辑的总体化-去总体化-再总体化的运动成为人们关注的焦点。与其表示历史“螺旋”的连续时刻，总化、去总化和再总化应被理解为不连续但在性质上不同的运动
155 Sartre differentiates a whole from a totality as follows: a “whole" is not a totality, but the unity of the totalising act insofar as it diversifies itself and embodies itself in totalised diversities.’ Ibid. 48, ft. 22.
156 Mészáros, The Work of Sartre: Search for Freedom and the Challenge of History, 243. Mészáros is commenting on historicąl, not individual, totalisation in Sartre in this passage, but the point remains the same: totalisation is not an adding up' of existing multiplicities. It is rather a double movement wherein multiplicity is multiplied to infinity, each part is set against all the others and against the whole which is in the process of being formed, while the totalising activity tightens all the bonds, making each differentiated element both its immediate expression and its mediation in relation to the other elements.’ Sartre, CDR 1, 46.
157 Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism, 36.
158 In his foreword to ,the Critique,, as part of his reading of Sartre’ s desire to dissociate himself from the standpoint of totality’ in Lukács' s History and Class Consciousness, Fredric Jameson sums this up: For Sartrea totality is precisely a static concept, a concept of being rather than of process, and one governed by analytic rather than by dialectical reason.’ Fredric Jameson, Foreword to Sartre, CDR 1, xxi.
159 Sartre, CDR 1, 45.
160 Ibid. 184. The ontological stats of the act from the standpoint of its performance by the practico-inert – what Sartre callspassive action’ -must be differentiated from the act as praxis.
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