At the same time, the 1844 writings do not thematise the idea that labour historicalises, that the production of the means of life is ‘a definite form of activity of…individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part.’<sup>45</sup> How does The German Ideology establish the creation of the means of life as a historical dynamic? How is the concept of ‘life’ in Marx a distinctly historical concept? How does the production of the means of life – the economic – constitute the elementary content of Marx’s philosophy of history?
<sup>40</sup> Osborne, How to Read Marx, 40.
<sup>41</sup> Marx and Engels, GI, 51. Emphasis added.
<sup>42</sup> Marx, EPM, 113.
<sup>43</sup> As Chitty reminds us, Marx’s concept of ‘true’, ‘inner’ or ‘human’ property and its differentiation from ‘outer’ or ‘private’ property, derives from Hegel’s conception of property as the objectification of free will in The Philosophy of Right (§41) and its opposition to ‘possession’ (§45). Possession is particular, whilst property is rational, and thereby universal (§49). See Chitty, ‘The Early Marx on Needs’, 30, ft. 19. This dovetails with the difference between ‘interchange’ [Austausch] as opposed to ‘exchange’ [Tausch].
<sup>44</sup> Ibid. 24.
<sup>45</sup> Marx and Engels, GI, 42. Emphasis added. A bit later: ‘…definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into…definite social and political relations.’ Ibid. 46. Emphasis added.
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