Marx and the Concept of Historical Time · 第 54 页

By “others” we do not mean all the rest but me – those over against whom the “I” stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one [man] does not distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too. This being-there-too…with them does not have the ontological character of a being-present-at-hand-along-“with” them within a world. This “with” is something of the character of Dasein; the “too” means a sameness of being as circumspectively concernful being-in-the-world.⁵⁴

This passage expresses a complex sociality at the core of the being of Dasein. As an existential analytic, Dasein represents an incipient ontology of the social as a particular kind of‘transindividual individuation’.⁵⁵ Specifically, Dasein’s sociality is a twofold individuation: following White, it sets Dasein off from other domains of entity (only Dasein, not the readyto-hand nor the present-at-hand, is capable of being-with) but only because, and here opposing White, this sociality differentiates one individual Dasein from another as ‘for the most part’ indistinguishable. Neither the ready-to-hand nor the present-at-hand are capable of being social, but, unlike Dasein, they are radically differentiated within-the-world. Herein lies a crucial dimension of the world, and to push Heidegger further than what he offers, the readyto-hand within-the-world: it conditions Dasein’s by and large undifferentiated sociality with the others. The world ‘frees’ the others, not as ready-to-hand nor as present-at-hand, but as ‘like the very Dasein which frees them, in that they are there too, and there with it.’⁵⁶ For Jean-Luc Nancy, this sociality forms ‘the very humble layer of our everyday experience.’⁵⁷ The others are the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein, and this is the existential meaning of their being, their ‘Dasein-with’. As Heidegger puts it, ‘this Dasein-with of the others is disclosed withinthe-world for a Dasein, and so too for those who are Daseins with us, only because Dasein in itself is essentially being-with.’⁵⁸ Heidegger fills out his characterisation of the others with an existentiale (and a thinly disguised fear of the masses) he names the ‘one’:

⁵² Ibid. 149. §26 of Being and Time, ‘The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with’, has been widely commentated on and is crucial to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Derrida and Roberto Esposito.

⁵³ Ibid. 155. As he puts it a bit later: ‘So far as Dasein is at all, it has being-with-one-another as its kind of being.’ Ibid. 163.

⁵⁴ Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit [1927] (hereafer SZ), in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 1: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970, Band 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 158 (BT, 154).

⁵⁵ The notion of ‘transindividual individuation’ has recently gained currency in the Anglo-American academy, primarily due to a growing reception of Gilbert Simondon and his commentators. See, for instance, Muriel Combes, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual [1999], trans. Thomas LaMarre (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2013). For readings of Marx which draw on Simondon, see Luca Basso, Marx and Singularity: from the Early Writings to the Grundrisse [2008], trans. Arianna Bove (Leiden/Boston/Cologne: Brill, 2012), as well as Jason Read, ‘The Production of Subjectivity: from Transindividuality to the Commons’, New Formations 70 (Winter 2011), 113-31.

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