lectures of the same year: Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time [1924], trans. William McNeill (Malden/Oxford/Carlton: Blackwell, 1992).
<sup>69</sup> Marx, JM, 274. See also Kostas Axelos, Alienation, Praxis, and Technē in the Thought of Karl Marx [1969], trans. Ronald Bruzina (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), 123-42. <sup>70</sup> Heidegger, BT, 223.
<sup>71</sup> Ibid. 220. It is difficult to accept Heidegger’s argument that falling ‘does not express any negative evaluation.’ Ibid. As he expresses it: ‘we…misunderstand the ontologico-existential structure of falling if we…ascribe to it the sense of a bad and deplorable ontical property of which, perhaps, more advanced stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves.’ Ibid. For an attempt to move past this strict separation between the ontic and the ontological, to think affinities between inauthenticity in Heidegger and alienation in Marx, see Anne F. Pomeroy, ‘Remythologizing Heidegger: Capitalism, Time, and Authenticity’, Φιλοσοφία (Philosophia): International Journal of Philosophy 37:2 (2008), 119-38.
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