It is structured by an anti-social individualism, but Heidegger’s analysis of death is not thereby irrelevant to the construction of a concept of historical time in Marx. Being-towardsdeath is not just the existential-ontological ground of temporalisation but so too the ground of the indissociable tie between temporalisation and totalisation. It thus has a direct bearing on the construction of a concept of historical time in Marx, but like all philosophical encounters, this has its conditions. The entire range of these is vast, but it is evident that Being and Time must be critically reconstructed in such a way that the anticipation of death becomes indelibly social.<sup>99</sup> Being-towards-death must become compatible with Marx’s distinctly social concept of the human. What this socialisation of death brings to light, as will soon be examined, is the problem of the historicality of the act in Heidegger more generally. With this socialisation comes an essential restriction of the Heideggerian project: time cannot give being as such.<sup>100</sup> Rather, time’s ‘gift’ is only Dasein. Or better: time and Dasein give one another. Restricting Heidegger in this fashion enables ‘the procedure of separating out the existential analytic of
<sup>97</sup> Heidegger, SZ, 351 (BT, 309).
<sup>98</sup> Heidegger, SZ, 349-50 (BT, 308).
<sup>99</sup> Osborne, ‘Marx and the Philosophy of Time’, 20.
<sup>100</sup> ‘Time cannot at all be present-at-hand, it does not at all have any sort of determinate being – rather it is the condition of the possibility that it gives something like being (not entities). Time does not have the sort of being of some other thing, but rather, time temporalises [Zeit zeitigt].’ Martin Heidegger, Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit [1925-6], in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 2: Vorlesungen 1923-1944, Band 21 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 410.
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