Marx and the Concept of Historical Time · 第 71 页

Dasein are successively added on top of one another. Being and Time is not a systematic text, such that the equi-originary denotes constitutive relations between different domains of what is originary. It is difficult, therefore, to conceive ofthe originary within ‘originary temporality as something else than an internal derivation ofworld-time and vulgar time. Yet this is exactly what Heidegger expects of us. Originary temporality is intended to grant us access, as earlier indicated, to ‘something like being’.

But if there is a single aspect of Heidegger’s failure to thematise the origin and the act which stands out more than any other, it is the impoverishment of the philosophy of history. Proceeding from the standpoint that the analysis of Dasein’s ability-to-be-a-whole has to this point been overdetermined by being-towards-death, that the ‘end’ which is Dasein’s beginning – its ‘birth’ – has been overlooked, the penultimate chapter of Being and Time introduces the existential and existentiell dimensions of the ‘happening’ [Geschehen] and the historicality [Geschichtlichkeit] of Dasein. For Heidegger, happening is the movement [Bewegtheit] of existence (not the motion [Bewegung] of something present-at-hand) which defines the way ‘in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along’¹²⁷ between its birth and its death, whereas historicality is the structural name of this happening. Historicality introduces nothing new to Dasein’s temporal character. It ‘merely reveals what already lies enveloped in the temporalising of temporality’, and is ‘at bottom, just a more concrete working out of temporality.’¹²⁸ The relationship between temporality and historicality essentially follows the relationship between understanding and interpretation: historicality is the interpretation of the temporality of understanding. Historicality does not influence the three ecstasies of originary temporality in any particular way, which is as much to say that history does not shape the ontological constitution of time in any particular way. The philosophical scope of historicality is accordingly limited to the elaboration of the existentiell possibilities (and solely authentic existentiell possibilities at that) of being-towards-death. The extent to which historicality has bearing on the existential analytic of Dasein is already established by originary temporality. Dasein’s fate is consequently ‘that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness for adversities’¹²⁹ and its destiny is thus the instantiation of its being-with, the co-happening of the community and the people, both of which enable Dasein to hand down factical possibilities to itself which have-been-there. This is for Heidegger the meaning of repetition, whereby the ‘peculiarly privileged position’ of the past (having-been-there) appears in the historical.¹³⁰ Yet historical repetition does not unseat the priority of the future, since it is only being-towardsdeath which enables repetition in the first place.

¹²⁷ Heidegger, BT, 427.

¹²⁸ Ibid. 428, 434.

¹²⁹ Ibid. 436.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 438.

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