Marx and the Concept of Historical Time · 第 76 页

The potential solution to this problem is the systematic reconstruction of the a priority of Heidegger’s world. This reconstruction would resituate the ontological structure of worldhistorical happening as integral to the ‘ontological enigma’ of the movement of happening in general, precisely because historicality is not simply the concrete working out of originary temporality. This solution would by no means remove contradiction from the world; rather, it would register the fundamental relationship between contradiction and historicalisation more generally. It would register a fundamental originariness to historicality irreducible to, because equi-originary with, the Ursprünglichkeit of temporality. This world presents the possibility of historicising the relationship between temporality and historicality in Being and Time. It theoretically enables us to address the previously raised question of the changing relationships between temporality and existentiell (authentic and inauthentic) modes of being. Of central importance to Marx, this world would therefore allow us to engage Being and Time from the standpoint of the ‘economic fact of the present’¹⁴⁸, thus rendering the ontological structure of capitalist everyday life constitutive of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s everyday use of time, or what he refers to as Dasein’s ‘reckoning with time’. For Heidegger, this is the temporality of circumspective concern which ‘permits’ the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand to be encountered in time. It is a temporality which guides Dasein’s everyday encounter with others, in which making present possesses a ‘peculiar importance’.¹⁴⁹ Yet there is nothing in Being and Time which allows us to historicise this importance, nothing which might historicise timereckoning as a particular ‘system of time accountancy’¹⁵⁰, whereby worldly entities receive their basic temporal attribute, their ‘within-time-ness’.¹⁵¹ Ultimately, the essential issue is this: Heidegger’s world is not just a de-historicising but a de-historicalising world, but what exactly does this mean? What is the existential-ontological meaning of ‘historicalisation’ itself?

¹⁴⁶ Blattner, ‘Temporality’, 321.

¹⁴⁷ Heidegger, SZ, 514 (BT, 441).

¹⁴⁸ Marx, EPM, 107. In her introduction to Marcuse’s Hegel’s Ontology, Seyla Benhabib essentially makes the same claim on behalf of Marcuse’s intervention, such that ‘a Heideggerian objection to the present work would be that it contains no clear distinction between the “world-historical” dimension, the historicity of entities and of our shared world, which unfolds in public space, and the “historicity” proper to Dasein.’ Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, xxx. Along with Marcuse, this thesis rejects a distinction between the ‘world-historical’ and ‘Dasein’ at the level of historicality. ¹⁴⁹ Heidegger, BT, 459.

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