{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","title":"[数字经济前沿]技术封建主义","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787300328508","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","id":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","uuid":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","title":"[数字经济前沿]技术封建主义","normalized_title":"数字经济前沿技术封建主义","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787300328508","isbns":["9787300328508"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":259,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%5B%E6%95%B0%E5%AD%97%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E5%89%8D%E6%B2%BF%5D%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF%E5%B0%81%E5%BB%BA%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/search"},"page":{"printed_page":133,"pdf_page":173,"physical_index":173,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"bf6e417377f0d624cd08a347b778acc20b9437af3fa58de76e405658b07859fa"},"chapter":"第三章","content":"自然垄断租金\n\n因此，加强对标准、技术和品牌的独家控制是全球化过程中知识垄断的强大推动力，但并不是唯一的动力。我与威廉·米尔伯格（WilliamMilberg）共同证明，还有另外三种机制促成了这一现象。③\n\n第一个原因是经济学家所说的自然垄断状况，即市场结构本身是三种要素作用的结果网络互补性、规模经济和沉没投资。④以铁路网为例，铁路网的覆盖面越广，作用就越大（网络互补性)；然而，铁路网的组织涉及固定成本（规模经济）；最后，铁路线一旦建成，就不可能再收回投资（沉没成本）。在这种情况下，由一家公司管理比开放竞争的市场更经济实惠。\n\n第三章 无形资产的食利者\n\n① Susan K. SELL, «TRIPS was never enough: vertical forum shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP», Journal of Intellectual Property Law, vol. 18, n° 2, 2010, p. 104- 160; Susan K. SELL et Aseem PRAKASH, «Using ideas strategically: the contest between business and NGO networks in intellectual property rights», International Studies Quarterly, vol. 48, n° 1, 2004, p. 143-175.\n\n②各种实证研究表明，贸易的增长与知识产权的收紧有关。参见：TitusO. AWOKUSE et Hong YIN, «Does stronger intellectual property rights protection induce more bilateral trade ? Evidence from China's imports», World Development , vol. 38, n°8, 2010, p. 1094-1104; Rod FALVEY, Neil FOSTER et David GREENAWAY, «Trade, imitative ability and intellectual property rights», Review of World Economics, vol. 145, n° 3, 2009, p. 373-404; Yungho WENG, Chih-Hai YANG et Yi-Ju HUANG, «Intellectual property rights and US information goods exports: the role of imitation threat», Journal of Cultural Economics, vol. 33, n° 2, 2009, p. 109。\n\n③ Cédric DURAND et William MILBERG, «Intellectual monopoly in global value chains», Review of International Political Economy, 2019 (ā paraître), en ligne.\n\n④ Manuela MOSCA, «On the origins of the concept of natural monopoly. Economies of scale and competition», The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought , vol. 15, n° 2, 2008, p. 317-353.\n\n133","previous_page":132,"next_page":134}