{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","title":"[数字经济前沿]技术封建主义","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787300328508","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","id":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","uuid":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","title":"[数字经济前沿]技术封建主义","normalized_title":"数字经济前沿技术封建主义","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787300328508","isbns":["9787300328508"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":259,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%5B%E6%95%B0%E5%AD%97%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E5%89%8D%E6%B2%BF%5D%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF%E5%B0%81%E5%BB%BA%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/search"},"page":{"printed_page":153,"pdf_page":193,"physical_index":193,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"96487410edaeb4586d82116ed33c716343e9214902da22cdbed043fb669ac0d2"},"chapter":"第四章","content":"这些新制度主义经济学家通过农奴制的棱镜来看待封建主义。他们认为，农奴制既不是一种“非自愿的奴役形式”，也不是一种“剥削方式”。他们认为农奴制是另一种东西，“本质上是一种契约安排，在这种安排中，一定数量的劳动服务被用来交换保护和正义的公共产品”。①他们如此概括自己的论点：\n\n普遍缺乏秩序意味着农民必须依靠拥有高超军事技能和装备的专业人员…。这是一个典型的公共产品的例子，因为保护一个农民家庭也意味着保护他们的邻居。因此，每个农民都倾向于让邻居支付费用。在这种情况下，必须采取某种形式的强制手段来获取防御所需的资源。\n\n领主的军事实力赋予了他收集这些资源的力量。从逻辑上讲，这也使他成为解决争端的负责人……。因此，领主很早就在保护者的角色中加入了司法管理。②\n\n这种关于世袭领地内农奴制的契约理论建立在描述初始情况的三个前提之上：（1）政治上的无政府状态造成普遍不安全的环境。（2）存在着两类参与者，一类拥有军事力量，另一类则没有，后者需要保护。（3）领主保护的公共产品性质，即非竞争性和非排他性。除了这三个前提之外，还有两个假设对契约逻辑至关重要。（4）存在着一种“原始的劳动力市场”①，暗示农奴在某种程度上拥有自由。诺思和托马斯实际上认为，领主之间争夺劳动力、缺乏中央集权以及存在大量未开垦土地等因素共同为农奴提供了离开领地的选择机会。（5）领主会“保护农奴以使其免受合同条款的任意变动”②。正是基于这五点，诺思和托马斯认为农奴制代表了“在无政府状态、自给自足以及军事力量存在差异等情况下”的“一种有效解决方案”。③\n\n第四章 技术封建主义假说\n\n① Douglass C. NORTH et Robert P. THOMAS, «The rise and fall of the manorial system: A theoretical model», The Journal of Economic History, vol. 31, n° 4, 1971, p. 778.\n\n② Douglass C. NORTH et Robert P. THOMAS, « The rise and fall of the manorial system: A theoretical model», The Journal of Economic History, vol. 31, n° 4, 1971, p. 778.\n\n153","previous_page":152,"next_page":154}