{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","title":"[数字经济前沿]技术封建主义","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787300328508","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","id":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","uuid":"06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","title":"[数字经济前沿]技术封建主义","normalized_title":"数字经济前沿技术封建主义","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787300328508","isbns":["9787300328508"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":259,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%5B%E6%95%B0%E5%AD%97%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E5%89%8D%E6%B2%BF%5D%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF%E5%B0%81%E5%BB%BA%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/06dd97ec-cce5-45df-9acf-40e36f07dab3/search"},"page":{"printed_page":205,"pdf_page":245,"physical_index":245,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"42c04d254e867d97de14e5ecdcc2a2773530dba05d4c5edbd4d0b9cd43bf815c"},"chapter":"第四章","content":"垂直一体化也是一种单边行动，没有扭曲市场的风险。他认为：“处于垄断地位的生产商为了在销售和制造两边都获得垄断利润而谋求控制销售，这是不合逻辑的。事实上，产品和销售相辅相成，因此提高销售价格会减少对产品的需求。”这将影响公司的销售额，从而使获得剩余利润的希望破灭。总之，垂直一体化只有在“出于对效率的追求，而不是出于垄断控制的企图”时才会发生。②\n\n在此不做详细分析，主要结果可归纳如下。公共干预不一定要解决产业集中的问题：\n\n持续的集中化要么意味着相关市场根本容不下许多公司(规模经济)，要么意味着某些公司由于成本降低或产品改进而获得超额利润，而竞争对手或新进入者都无法复制。对这两种情况都没有必要进行旨在改变市场结构的公共干预。③\n\n附录二 反垄断嬉皮士与芝加哥学派\n\n① Richard A. POSNER, «The Chicago School of antitrust analysis», University of Pennsylvania Law Review, n° 127, 1979, p. 927.\n\n② Richard A. POSNER, «The Chicago School of antitrust analysis», University of Pennsylvania Law Review, n° 127, 1979, p. 927.\n\n③ Richard A. POSNER, «The Chicago School of antitrust analysis», University of Pennsylvania Law Review, n° 127, 1979, p. 945.\n\n205","previous_page":204,"next_page":206}