{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","title":"论数码物的存在","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787208154346","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","id":"0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","uuid":"0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","title":"论数码物的存在","normalized_title":"论数码物的存在","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787208154346","isbns":["9787208154346"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":317,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E8%AE%BA%E6%95%B0%E7%A0%81%E7%89%A9%E7%9A%84%E5%AD%98%E5%9C%A8","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12/search"},"page":{"printed_page":110,"pdf_page":120,"physical_index":120,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"111100d91c935f1d2a4cec4f6dfc525dade397a6a87b42d447e4ea04c43d786d"},"chapter":"第三章","content":"意向现象学是先验现象学，但是还原为意向性能思的先验并非真正的先验，即所有可能经验的先天条件，如果它总是需要与自身完全不同的东西：感觉、印象。后者必须首先为了经验能够发生而被给予。[23]\n\n因此，我们面临的问题是如何理解“非本身”与“基础步骤”。胡塞尔不能接受将这种“非本身”作为主体性的构成，因为它使我思(cogito)不纯粹。亨利解决第一个所予问题与第一个内在问题的动力可以从两个更广泛的意义上进一步理解。首先，感官资料在胡塞尔现象学中没有得到恰当的处理，但却被归纳为我思的主动阐明。其次，所予—作为现象的客体的出现除了超验还原之外，不会受到质疑。此类现象学的无知根源一般来自数量级。为了解决这一问题，我们需要研究另一个数量级，并试图通过重新引入关系的概念来解决这种差异。重要的是，现代技术通过对“基础步骤”与“非本身”的挪用与修改，重新构成我们的经验，包括时间：(1)经验与逻辑传统—特别是大卫·休谟的关系哲学与伯特兰·罗素的关系演算，以及(2)关于胡塞尔与海德格尔将时间性作为原始关系的解释。这两种思路也可以被看作是“本体论差异”的范例。最终，我们可以说，这种本体论差异对应于两个数量级的差异。\n\n论数码物的存在\n\n120\n\n110","previous_page":null,"next_page":null}