{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","title":"论数码物的存在","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787208154346","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","id":"0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","uuid":"0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","title":"论数码物的存在","normalized_title":"论数码物的存在","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787208154346","isbns":["9787208154346"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":317,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E8%AE%BA%E6%95%B0%E7%A0%81%E7%89%A9%E7%9A%84%E5%AD%98%E5%9C%A8","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/0f4df77e-fbc5-46b5-aca2-e27886d75b12/search"},"page":{"printed_page":"125 / 115","pdf_page":125,"physical_index":125,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"b74b1bfcc750d4276fa175e925b30ebbc46296c49de96f5ff5c02a8db8ffb983"},"chapter":"第三章","content":"休谟对亚里士多德实体一偶性二元的批判\n\n实体一偶性二元的不足限制了数百年来对事物的理解。鲁道夫·伽谢(Rodolphe Gasché)在他的《论最小事物》一书中指出：“在很大程度上，关系逻辑在19世纪的出现源于对实体/偶性本体论极大地限制关系分析的看法。”[43]伽谢意指伯特兰·罗素的逻辑原子论，但我们可以观察到，这一发现本身很大程度上归功于英国经验主义的遗产，尤其是大卫·休谟的原子论。[44]怀着怀疑的精神，休谟的第一个举动是摧毁主语一谓述的概念。他将我们对事物的概念分为两类：一类是“印象”，另一类是“观念”。对休谟而言，印象是事物存在的直接证据，也是所有观念的来源。他区分了两种印象：“知觉印象”（仍然保持心灵内部所感知的生动性)与“反思印象”(这些印象是悲伤或饥饿等情感)。一个“观念”大致可以被认为是一个模糊的印象。所以我们的知识应该以这两种形式的印象为基础。休谟在开始他的论述时说，因为没有人会“断言，实体要么是颜色，要么是声音或味道”，“实体的观念因此必须来自反思印象，融入我们的激情和情绪。”然而，他反对这种可能性，他认为“(这些激情和情绪)都不可能代表实体”，因此“我们的实体观念，不外乎于一系列特殊性质的集合，当我们说话或思考它\n\n第三章网络空间\n\n125\n\n115","previous_page":124,"next_page":126}