{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","title":"Time for Things Labor, Leisure, and the Rise of Mass Consumption","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780674250529","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","id":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","uuid":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","title":"Time for Things Labor, Leisure, and the Rise of Mass Consumption","normalized_title":"timeforthingslaborleisureandtheriseofmassconsumption","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780674250529","isbns":["9780674250529","9780674250536","9780674979512"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":355,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Time%20for%20Things%20Labor%2C%20Leisure%2C%20and%20the%20Rise%20of%20Mass%20Consumption","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/search"},"page":{"printed_page":103,"pdf_page":111,"physical_index":111,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"89c02e40502ae99f4b3187bed072569602be85d9aa16bf0cfcf705ba026be83d"},"chapter":"FOR","content":"Esping-Andersen uses a variety of measures to create a composite score indicating the extent to which diferent nations have efectively decommodified labor. He finds that countries can be grouped into three categories, characterized by particular histories of policy orientation. The three categories, in ascending order of level of decommodification, are liberal welfare states, corporatist welfare states, and social democratic welfare states. The liberal welfare states are the Anglo-Saxon nations, the corporatist states are those of continental Europe (excluding Scandinavia and including Japan), and the social democratic set comprises Scandinavia (excluding Finland), Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands.27\n\nFrom a standard economic viewpoint, stronger welfare states—those that to a greater extent decommodify labor—should have lower saving rates and therefore higher rates of spending. This is because the presence of a strong safety net lessens the need to save defensively. Although the correlation between saving / spending and the extent of welfare provision is not an issue that Esping-Andersen investigates, data from other sources indicate that saving rates have in fact been lowest in the liberal states—those that are the least decommodified according to Esping-Andersen. In the Euro area since 1991, for example, household saving rates have been between two and a half and three times higher than in the United States, a member of Esping-Andersen’s least decommodified group, while saving in Japan (categorized as part of the corporatist group) has been between four and six times higher. Net household saving rates between 1985 and 2009 in the countries that make up Esping-Andersen’s liberal group, which is the least decommodified, are consistently among the lowest in the OECD (Garon 2012). Comparing the subset of nations that are members of the OECD from each of Esping-Andersen’s groups, average saving rates between 1985 and 2009 are 11.6 percent for the corporatist group, 9.6 percent for the social democratic group, and 5.6 percent for the liberal group (see Appendix 2 for table of OECD figures).28 While the corporatist and social democratic welfare states have quite similar levels of saving, the saving rates of the liberal welfare states—those with the least in the way of a safety net—are significantly lower.29\n\nOnce more, this pattern is surprising, as there would seem to be more reason to save in contexts in which people are more dependent on the labor market for their economic survival. Yet it becomes less surprising when interpreted in terms of the theory of consumption as wage-labor commensuration. If the commensuration theory is correct, then the pattern would follow as a matter of course, and the grounds for surprise would be removed. The theory entails that consumer materialism—defined as the propensity to turn increasing hourly wages into increased consumption, rather than reduced work time or increased savings—should be positively correlated with the extent to which labor is commodified (or, in Esping-Andersen’s terms, not decommodified). The reasoning for this goes as follows:\n\nA Theory of Mass Consumption as Wage-Labor Commensuration\n\n103","previous_page":102,"next_page":104}