{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","title":"Time for Things Labor, Leisure, and the Rise of Mass Consumption","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780674250529","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","id":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","uuid":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","title":"Time for Things Labor, Leisure, and the Rise of Mass Consumption","normalized_title":"timeforthingslaborleisureandtheriseofmassconsumption","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780674250529","isbns":["9780674250529","9780674250536","9780674979512"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":355,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Time%20for%20Things%20Labor%2C%20Leisure%2C%20and%20the%20Rise%20of%20Mass%20Consumption","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/search"},"page":{"printed_page":289,"pdf_page":297,"physical_index":297,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"2f4f5ba44243b0c4f46a649e21e5ce696225a36b1e25737cc9037d1794525a82"},"chapter":"FOR","content":"7. The roughness of this estimate indicates how challenging it is to come up with precise figures measuring this expanded concept of productivity. However, DeLong argues that most economists who have studied the issue agree that the true increase in productivity figure lies somewhere in that range.\n\n8. Per capita income in 1900 was \\$4,200 in 1999 dollars, while in 1999 it was \\$33,700, an eightfold increase (Fisk 2001).\n\n9. On the assumption that average marginal productivity of the workforce declines with added units of labor, all other things being equal, shedding labor would also increase productivity.\n\n10. A recent Gallup poll about work time found that people worked forty-seven hours each week, with only one in ten people working the oficial forty-hour week (Saad 2014).\n\n11. The exact numbers vary according to which source is used. The census of manufacturing shows a drop in hours from 59.6 in 1900 to 51.2 in 1919. Ethel Jones (1963) found that hours in manufacturing dropped from 55.5 in 1900 to 46 in 1919. John Owen’s (1976, 1988) analysis of hours for nonstudent males over the same period finds a decrease from 58.5 hours in 1900 to 50 hours in 1919.\n\n12. For a very critical assessment of Schor’s argument, see Lebergott (1996). However, research by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1997) indicates that workers did put in more hours on average over the last quarter of the twentieth century. Total hours worked per year, for those who worked at all between 1976 and 1993, increased from 1,805 to 1,905 for men and from 1,293 to 1,526 for women.\n\n13. The current population survey of work time is based on how many hours of work people do in total each week, so numbers of jobs is controlled for.\n\n14. Annual work hours in the United States were 1,983 in 1950 and 1,764 in 2014, while productivity increased from \\$18.24 per hour in 1950 to \\$63.35 in 2014 (Roser 2018).\n\n15. 433/10 = 43. A 43 percent increase in productivity multiplies person hour output by 1.43. Forgoing that increase in output, the person could produce the same output as she did before the increase in productivity in about two-thirds of the time. So, had this portion of increasing productivity since 1929 been used to reduce work time, the working week would by 2007 have been reduced by about one-third (48 hours in 1929/1.43 = 29.3 hours). Applying the same calculation, converting 20 percent of the 433 percent increase in productivity between 1929 and 2007 into less work time, at the cost of lower output, would reduce working time in 2007 compared to 1929 by about one half—so workers would put in a 24-hour workweek, rather than a 39-hour week. Of course, a 24-hour week would result in 2007 output dropping by close to 40 percent, a very substantial reduction and obviously one that people in 2007 would be not likely to countenance. However, the decision to take some of the benefits of increasing productivity in the form of fewer work hours at the same level of income would have been made incrementally over time.\n\n16. Interestingly, Hobsbawm (1964) notes that this did not always militate against the interests of the employers. Customary rates also applied to compensation, so if the profits of an enterprise increased, workers would not demand an increased share of revenues.\n\n17. Costa’s explanation for the growth of female part-time work is that it was a response on the part of firms to a decline in the female workforce, caused by lower age at marriage, the baby boom, and increasing college attendance by women. By ofering flexible, part-time work, businesses hoped to entice women back into the workforce.\n\nNotes to Pages 45–51\n\n289","previous_page":288,"next_page":290}