{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","title":"Time for Things Labor, Leisure, and the Rise of Mass Consumption","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780674250529","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","id":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","uuid":"10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","title":"Time for Things Labor, Leisure, and the Rise of Mass Consumption","normalized_title":"timeforthingslaborleisureandtheriseofmassconsumption","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780674250529","isbns":["9780674250529","9780674250536","9780674979512"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":355,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Time%20for%20Things%20Labor%2C%20Leisure%2C%20and%20the%20Rise%20of%20Mass%20Consumption","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/10f0f318-a2eb-4ea9-8798-d4fb0304f8c3/search"},"page":{"printed_page":51,"pdf_page":59,"physical_index":59,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"00331a406997a51bf90c2d092c821ca6b6ac3993b283a9d4c0ce25f1e3dd6ca2"},"chapter":"FOR","content":"A large part of the improvement in productivity in modern capitalist economies has been the result of capitalists fighting against these lackadaisical work habits, exerting greater control of the labor process, in order to increase the intensity of work. For example, Joel Mokyr, examining productivity in the British economy between 1856 and 1973, notes that GDP per hour worked increased over that period by an average of 1.7 percent per year. Yet once the “quality” of labor is taken into account, adjusting for education levels and, most importantly, for increases in the intensity of efort, the increase in productivity over this period drops to 0.7 percent (Mokyr 2003). If a substantial proportion of increasing productivity is accounted for by the increasing intensity of the labor process then, as productivity advances, work per hour will tend to become more draining on the worker. Under these conditions we might expect a strengthening rather than an attenuating preference for fewer hours on the part of workers. The fact that the tendency for hours to drop diminishes in the latter two-thirds of the twentieth century then becomes even more perplexing.\n\nOne complicating factor when considering changes in productivity, wages, and hours is the impact of the entry of women into the workforce. In 1900, roughly 20 percent of women participated in paid work. By 2000, that figure had risen to 60 percent (Dora Costa 2000b). The result of this change has been an overall increase in the labor force, on one estimate accounting for a 50 percent rise in the working population aged between twenty-five and forty-four over the first four-fifths of the century (Goldin 1986). Much of the growth in female labor took the form of part-time work, particularly after 1950.17 According to Dora Costa (2000b, p. 109), “in 1950, 23% of all working married women in couples where both spouses were between ages 25 to 39 were working fewer than 35 hours a week. By 1970 this proportion was 35% and in 1998 was still 33%.” The tendency for women to work part-time hours meant that the efect of more women entering the labor force was to depress average hours worked per employee.18A decrease in overall average hours caused by the mobilization of women as part-time workers clearly should not be interpreted as an increase in leisure.19 Indeed, according to Avner Ofer’s analysis, hours devoted to wage labor per household with children increased significantly between the late 1960s and the end of the century. On his estimation, “families with children had a combined 53 hour week working for pay in 1968, and a 64 hour working week in 2000” (Ofer 2006, p. 298).20\n\nEmpirical Pattern in the United States\n\n51","previous_page":50,"next_page":52}