{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title":"德勒兹关键概念","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787568912952","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","uuid":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title":"德勒兹关键概念","normalized_title":"德勒兹关键概念","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787568912952","isbns":["9787568912952","9781844652884"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":409,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9%E5%85%B3%E9%94%AE%E6%A6%82%E5%BF%B5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/search"},"page":{"printed_page":258,"pdf_page":272,"physical_index":272,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"1b30f9a9e34594fbbbfcfdb237216792b2350affe4c29a27e3591d550b321088"},"chapter":"德勒兹：关键概念 （原书第2版）","content":"是一种色彩，是一种必须在它自身当中才能找到的妙不可言的特性，独立于被挫伤的皮肉之外，而主体关系的纯粹知性的实现似乎也应该由它构成。这个概念是幼稚的，它把分析推到了一条奇怪的道路上……情动并不是一种可以逃避知性的解释的特殊的密度。\n\n(1988:57)\n\n但是，德勒兹和加塔利在他们共同的和各自的著作中恰恰选择去走这条“奇怪的道路”，尽管他们会在一点上和拉康保持一致，那就是：“情动逃避知性的解释”，并不用穿越你从事思考的地方(whercyou think)，也就是说，并不用穿越那些存在着思想的形象(imagc ofthought)的地方。\n\n因此，正如德勒兹在他自己的研讨班上对听众说的那样：“每一种思想模式，只要是非表象性的，就可以被称为情动”(1997c)。一条情动的道路，不能穿过那些由表象和思想形象占据着主导地位或支配全局的地方。因为情动是思想形象之外的更进一步的东西：一个情动——首先作为斯宾诺莎的affectio—就是(人或其他的事物的)身体在一个变动而又开放的系统中所经历的转变效果，而这个系统是由存在的各种各样不可胜数的力量及其关系构成的。更简单地说，情状(affectio)就是一个身体影响另一个身体，或被另一个身体影响的状态²。而情动(affect)却不能被话语，被形象或表象，被意识或思想所转变和限制。同样重要的是，正如我们将要看到的，情动的概念具有自足性(不仅来源于理智，也源自情动的一身体性的描摹)这正是拉康(和后继的拉康派)拒绝接受的，他不认为这是一条切实可行的途径。\n\n258\n\n德勒兹：关键概念(原书第2版)","previous_page":null,"next_page":259}