{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title":"德勒兹关键概念","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787568912952","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","uuid":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title":"德勒兹关键概念","normalized_title":"德勒兹关键概念","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787568912952","isbns":["9787568912952","9781844652884"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":409,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9%E5%85%B3%E9%94%AE%E6%A6%82%E5%BF%B5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/search"},"page":{"printed_page":274,"pdf_page":288,"physical_index":288,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"d9a20cdca0801e256a7cb3942f452818d145a0e1e5a23ed18d6e87c6724142f3"},"chapter":"德勒兹：关键概念 （原书第2版）","content":"人类主体只有“在褶子的条件下”(这个准则将被视为一个重要的准则），通过知识、权力和情动的过滤才能被理解。褶子这种据说使福柯着迷的形式，被展示为某种在被陈述或被说出的事物与可见的或被看到的事物之间经受折叠的东西。在“可见性”形态与“话语性”形态之间展开的区分之所以被提出，是为了从(海德格尔和梅洛-庞蒂所理解的)意向性(intentionality)那里抽身而出，这种意向性将把主体性和现象学联系起来。被说出来的事物并不指向一个原原本本的或个性化的主体，而是指向一种“存在-语言”(being-language)，而可见性事物则指向“存在-光线”(bcing-light)，它照亮了那摆脱一切意向性凝视的“形式、比例和观点”(FCLT：109，译文有改动)。在其讨论莱布尼茨的作品问世之前，德勒兹就注意到，福柯使意向性在看和说这“两个单子”(FCLT：109，译文有改动)的间隙中毁于一旦。这样一来，现象学就被转换成了认识论。看和说就是认识，“但是我们看不到自己正在说的东西，我们也没法说自己正在看的东西”(FCLT：109，译文有改动)。没有什么能够先于或早于认识(savoir)，尽管知识或认识作为说和看，作为语言和光线“不可避免地具有双重性”(FCLT：109，译文有改动)——因此它们是被折叠起来的—它们独立于作为说话者和观看者的意向性主体(intending subjects)。\n\n274\n\n德勒兹：关键概念(原书第2版)\n\n195","previous_page":null,"next_page":275}