{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title":"德勒兹关键概念","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787568912952","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","uuid":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title":"德勒兹关键概念","normalized_title":"德勒兹关键概念","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787568912952","isbns":["9787568912952","9781844652884"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":409,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9%E5%85%B3%E9%94%AE%E6%A6%82%E5%BF%B5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/search"},"page":{"printed_page":"292 / 207","pdf_page":306,"physical_index":306,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"8b9f48738d9d15d6e7b44eba8b910427abc67e1d48345696a3dea716f193b79f"},"chapter":"德勒兹：关键概念 （原书第2版）","content":"的确，在许多情况下，病例的症状描述本身就很充分，无需发明相应的概念。菲尼斯·盖奇(Phineas Gage)’这个不同寻常的例子—他在额叶严重损坏的情况下活了下来—为神经病学研究开辟了重要道路。”而在戈德斯坦(Goldstein)和盖尔布(Gelb)1918年报道的约翰·施奈德(Johann Schnieider)”的病例中，病人可以抓挠他的鼻子，却无法指认它，这似乎揭示了具体实践和“抽象态度”(归类化)之间的差异。1梅洛-庞蒂(Merleau-Ponty)在阐发《知觉现象学》（Phenomenology of Perception,2002）中的“身体图式”（corporealschema)时，采用了施奈德这个例子。奥利弗·萨克斯(()liverSacks)的《错把妻子当帽子》(Man Who Mistook His Wife for aIlat)\"似乎显示出相反的状况：他坚持“抽象态度”，但是甚至丧失了识别自己妻子面孔的具体能力(面部失认症)(1970:8-22)。在所有这类情况中，病理研究的症状学提出了特殊的问题，神经病学要为之寻找病原学根据。这就是为什么德勒兹会写道，“作为临床医学科学性与实验性一面，病原学必须从属于症状学，而症状学则是其文学艺术的一面”(M：133)。\n\n临床医学的历史因此可以被看作至少有两个层面。第一个层面是疾病史(the history of diseases),它会随着大量外在因素—新的细菌或病毒的出现，被革新的科学和治疗技术，不断变化的社会条件而消逝、远去，或者重新出现并改头换面。但与此相互缠绕着的是症状学史(the history of symtomatology)，它是临床医学的一种“语法”(syntax)，有时候落后于治疗或疾病性质的变化，有时候则先于这种变化：症状以各种方式被分离、命名、重新命名、重新组织。从后一种角度来说，瘟疫和麻风病在过去更为常见，不仅是因为历史与社会的原因，还因为“人们倾向于把各种各样的疾病都聚集在这些名目之下，而这些疾病现在都被分门别类了”（M：\n\n292\n\n德勒兹：关键概念(原书第2版)\n\n207","previous_page":305,"next_page":307}