{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title":"德勒兹关键概念","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787568912952","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","uuid":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title":"德勒兹关键概念","normalized_title":"德勒兹关键概念","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787568912952","isbns":["9787568912952","9781844652884"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":409,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9%E5%85%B3%E9%94%AE%E6%A6%82%E5%BF%B5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/search"},"page":{"printed_page":33,"pdf_page":59,"physical_index":59,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"2d597c49650a16eb8a99f8b489704679ca0db889e935b1245a011bfb30acc4cb"},"chapter":"德勒兹：关键概念 （原书第2版）","content":"表 现\n\n格雷格·兰伯特\n\n表现(expression)，或“哲学中的表现主义”(expressionism)这个概念首次出现于德勒兹1968年—他的系统性研究《差异与重复》也于同年出版—出版的论斯宾诺莎的长篇专著中，并在其中得到了充分的发展。因此，这两部重要著作可以被共同理解为通向哲学史中差异思想的两条不同途径。在斯宾诺莎的哲学中，表现问题首先涉及内部思想(internal thought)和外部身体(cxternalbodies)之间的相互作用，以及思想是如何把这种内与外之间的关系表现为内在于思想力量的。通过阅读斯宾诺莎，德勒兹首先着手解决的难题正是“何者存在于真实的思想之中”，这种思想使它能够胜任或“表现”事物的本质，好像“它就是事物本身”（EPS：15)。这一难题的解决办法在斯宾诺莎的平行论(parallelism)¹的基本原则中找到了，在平行论中，思想的表现性被认为内在于事物自身，而且正是真理的性质完全地或完美地表现了这种内在性(immanence)。尽管经常被归因于斯宾诺莎的平行论哲学，但德勒兹是从斯多葛派哲学，特别是从关于意义的非实体性理论中引出了表现逻辑的关键部分。然而，表现问题并不限于德勒兹对斯宾诺莎、莱布尼茨或笛卡尔等古典哲学家的评论。正如我下面详细叙述的那样，这个问题也为德勒兹和加塔利讨论语言性质的著作——这种语言被理解为“口令”（order-words)和“阐释的集体装置”(collective assemblage of enunciation)——以及他后来在讨论福柯著作中的思考力的认识论特性时奠定了基础。\n\n33","previous_page":32,"next_page":34}