{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title":"德勒兹关键概念","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787568912952","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","id":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","uuid":"1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title":"德勒兹关键概念","normalized_title":"德勒兹关键概念","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787568912952","isbns":["9787568912952","9781844652884"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":409,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9%E5%85%B3%E9%94%AE%E6%A6%82%E5%BF%B5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1cd40951-874b-4d06-9eea-f6afadf57c08/search"},"page":{"printed_page":66,"pdf_page":80,"physical_index":80,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"d66d6f3999346ea14937cd11431ff481ccc9d439125257dc830fa522dc9e8758"},"chapter":"德勒兹：关键概念 （原书第2版）","content":"从德勒兹的观点来看，莱布尼茨和黑格尔所举的例子的问题在于，根据表象的思维模式，概念的同一性仍然被保留为思想的核心参照点。“表象体制”(regime of representation)是一个体系，同一性概念—不管是普遍的还是个别的—借以在事物的本质与思想的本质之间形成了交汇点。在挑战这个概念的过程中，德勒兹不仅挑战了(在客观上)存在着某种在本质属性的命令中被表现出来的“事物本质”这种思想，还挑战了(在主观上)概念构成了可理解性(intelligibility)的基本单位这种思想；他还对同一性概念作为思想及其对象之间的理想的或预期的关系这种作用提出了抗辩。也就是说，他对思想的月的就是表象，就是让已经以非概念形式存在的东西明确化、概念化这种观念提出了挑战。德勒兹没有从“事实”的角度—也就是说我们的表象“实际上”和某个事物的本质并不一致，它并不适合或者适用于这样一个目的——挑战这个观念。相反，他是从这个观念所呈现的思想目的与功能的特定概念这个层面来挑战这个观念的；是从“正确”的观点出发来提出挑战的。对于德勒兹来说，表象(representation)以及相关的思想，比如“反映”(reflection)、“交流”（communication)等，展现的都是关于哲学目的及活动的错误“形象”。\n\n66\n\n德勒兹：关键概念(原书第2版)\n\n47","previous_page":null,"next_page":67}