{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","title":"If...Then Algorithmic Power and Politics","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"2017054909","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","id":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","uuid":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","title":"If...Then Algorithmic Power and Politics","normalized_title":"ifthenalgorithmicpowerandpolitics","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"2017054909","isbns":["2017054909","9780190493042","9780190493059"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":211,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/If...Then%20Algorithmic%20Power%20and%20Politics","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/search"},"page":{"printed_page":165,"pdf_page":175,"physical_index":175,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"87ffcbb76bfc0034ba26ea288efc362e7b362670c318b0786ee0531c7246e494"},"chapter":"IF...THEN","content":"15. Some scholars would argue that the sociotechnical and sociomateriality are not the same but denote diferent things. The concept of sociomateriality has been particularly important to research in information systems and organizational studies. For a discussion on how what these terms mean and how they might be distinguished, see Leonardi, Nardi & Kallinikos (2013).\n\n16. As with the terms sociotechnical and sociomaterial, the concepts of network, assemblage, and hybrids have their own intellectual history that do not necessarily overlap entirely. While they all denote a composite term that implies some form of co-constitution between humans and the more than human, the term hybrid relates to actor-network theory and the work of Bruno Latour in particular, whereas assemblage is more of a Deleuzian concept (although applied and used by thinkers afiliated with actor-network theory such as Michael Callon). For an understanding of hybrids, see Latour’s example of the citizen-gun or gun-citizen that he describes on several occasions but, most explicitly, in Latour (1994). Whereas hybrids refer to the relations between heterogeneous entities, the notion of assemblage also points to the process of assembling, not merely to the existence of a composite entity. In Deleuze and Guatari’s account, an assemblage is not just a thing but also an ongoing organizing of multiplicities (see Deleuze & Guatari, 1987). Assemblage should not just be understood as a gathering of subjectivities and technical objects but, rather, in the sense of its original French meaning of agencement—a process of assembling rather than a static arrangement (see Packer & Wiley, 2013; Callon, 2007). For a good overview of the similarities and diferences between actor-network theory and the concept of assemblages, see Müller (2015).\n\n17. See DeLanda (2006) for a discussion on these terms and how they difer. The main ontological diference can be found between those who focus on “relations of interiority” and those who maintain a focus on “relations of exteriority.” The former notion claims that nothing exists outside of relations, whereas the later contends that the parts of an assemblage can have intrinsic qualities outside of its associations (Müller, 2015: 31). For Karen Barad, an influential philosopher commited to a relational ontology (or agential realism as she calls it) “relata do not preexist relations” (2003:815). An agential realist account emphasizes entanglements not as intertwining of separate entities, but rather as relata-within-phenomena that emerge through specific intra-actions (ibid.). As Barad puts it, “why do we think that the existence of relations requires relata?” (2003: 812). If Barad’s ontological commitments constitute one side of the spectrum, most theorists commited to a relational ontology are either less explicit about their metaphysical claims or formulate a theory that atempts to account for the relative autonomy of entities outside of their relations. In contrast to Barad, Deleuze explicitly states that “relations are external to their terms” (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007: 55), meaning that “a relation may change without the terms changing” (See Delanda, 2006: 11).\n\n18. The US Senate Commerce Commitee sent a leter to Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerburg, looking for answers on its trending topics section. In the leter, Senator John Thune, chairman of the commitee, accused Facebook of presenting the feature as the result of an objective algorithm while, in reality, human involvement made it much more “subjective.”\n\n19. Here, I am borrowing from Bloomfield et al. (2010: 420), who revisit the notion of afordances and urge researchers to consider the question of when an afordance is.\n\n20. Lucy Suchmann makes a similar argument in her book Human-Machine Reconfiguration in which she turns away from questions of “whether humans and machines are the same or different to how and when the categories of human or machine become relevant, how relations of sameness or diference between them are enacted on particular occasions, and with what discursive and material consequences” (2007: 2).\n\nNOTES TO PAGES 50–55\n\n165","previous_page":164,"next_page":166}