{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","title":"If...Then Algorithmic Power and Politics","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"2017054909","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","id":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","uuid":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","title":"If...Then Algorithmic Power and Politics","normalized_title":"ifthenalgorithmicpowerandpolitics","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"2017054909","isbns":["2017054909","9780190493042","9780190493059"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":211,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/If...Then%20Algorithmic%20Power%20and%20Politics","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/search"},"page":{"printed_page":169,"pdf_page":179,"physical_index":179,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"9cd79a2cff727147bc23f5ea01b39065a8e1d86e1308c7265cb3725a9cca8d88"},"chapter":"IF...THEN","content":"3. @YazibelleXO, February 6, 2016.\n\n4. For Raymond Williams, the notion of “structures of feeling” denotes a historically distinct kind of feeling and thinking around a particular quality of social experience and relationship (1977: 130). What defines this social experience is its emergent character as something felt but still not fully articulable as such due to its historical unfolding presence in the here-andnow. For Williams, “structures of feelings” became a way of recognizing moments of new experiential impulses and paterns as a way to analyze cultural change and the unruly reality of social life.\n\n5. As Clough and Halley (2007) point out, the social sciences and humanities have seen an “afective turn” in times of ongoing conflict and crisis, a turn that has sought to make analytical sense of what cannot necessarily be explained or made sense of using the language of reason. The study of afect, understood as the study of how bodies are moved, how the world in some way or another afects us and how we, in turn, afect the world, has atracted a number of scholars and thinkers within philosophy, feminist theory, psychology, political science, cultural and social geography, media studies, and critical theory—to name but a few. As suggested by Gregg and Seigworth in their introduction to The Afect Theory Reader (2010), two vectors have been particularly pertinent in the turn to afect, both culminating with publications in 1995. On one hand, there was the essay by Sedgwick and Frank called “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold” (1995) and the corresponding book Shame and Its Sisters (1995), both of which introduced readers to the psychology of afect developed by Silvan Tomkins. On the other hand, there was an essay by Brian Massumi on the “Autonomy of Afect” (1995), which expanded on Deleuze’s Spinozan ethology of bodily capacities. So, if the first vector of afect sets afect apart from previous psychoanalytic conceptions of drives as the primary motivational system in human beings, the second strand concerns the many contemporary reinterpretations of Spinoza’s ethico-political writings (Spinoza, 2000)— most notably, by Deleuze (1988, 1990) and his followers. On the most basic level, afect can be understood as the capacity to afect and be afected.\n\n6. Email interview with “Michael,” October 3, 2014.\n\n7. Paraphrased from a tweet “Rachel” posted on October 14, 2014.\n\n8. Multiple email interviews and online chats with “Rachel,” October 15–26, 2014.\n\n9. On a more general level, the question of how people encounter and make sense of new technology is, of course, one the core questions not only within media studies but also in related fields such as STS and IS research. In media studies, these questions have been extensively discussed within audience and media use research—for instance, through the lens of domestication theory, which focuses on the emotional and symbolic dimensions of communication technologies and how the meanings of technology have to be understood as emergent properties of contextualized audience practices (see Berker, Hartmann & Punie, 2005; Hirsch & Silverstone, 2003; Morley & Silverstone, 1990; Morley, 2003). In science and technology studies, the publication of The Social Construction of Technological Systems in 1987 popularized the notion of the social construction of technology, or SCOT, as a way to theorize and analyze technological innovation not as the result of designers but as fundamentally co-constructed in negotiations with users and other stakeholders (see Bijker & Law, 1994; Bijker et al., 2012; Pinch & Bijker, 1984). One of the most influential ideas in terms of understanding the meanings users atribute to technology is the notion that artefacts have “interpretative flexibility,” meaning that there is flexibility in the design, use, and interpretation of technology (see Orlikowski, 1992). The idea that technologies do not have fixed meanings or determine use has also been a cornerstone of much research within information systems and organization science—particularly, in fields such as computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW), human-computer interaction (HCI) and social informatics (see, for example, Lamb & Kling, 2003; Kling, 1980; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994; Orlikowski, 2000). One of the earliest accounts of the relationship that people forge with computers is Sherry Turkle’s book The Second Self (1984) in which she describes the computer as a “marginal object” that defies easy categorization. A computer, she found, means more to people than merely a physical thing. It is also a metaphysical thing that influences how people think of themselves and others (Turkle, 1984: 16).\n\nNOTES TO PAGES 93–96\n\n169","previous_page":168,"next_page":170}