{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","title":"If...Then Algorithmic Power and Politics","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"2017054909","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","id":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","uuid":"1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","title":"If...Then Algorithmic Power and Politics","normalized_title":"ifthenalgorithmicpowerandpolitics","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"2017054909","isbns":["2017054909","9780190493042","9780190493059"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":211,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/If...Then%20Algorithmic%20Power%20and%20Politics","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1d3bd28e-c1ba-4af2-8580-60b32ef26053/search"},"page":{"printed_page":174,"pdf_page":184,"physical_index":184,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"31e5a28991036c9c467f2dbfa933d58054ca92e41eeca196d6cedfb2cee76cdb"},"chapter":"IF...THEN","content":"14. “Event thinking” has emerged as an influential philosophical avenue for contesting the concepts of facts and substance—particularly, as it relates to epistemology and the philosophy of science. Theorists such as Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers, Alfred North Whitehead, and Gilles Deleuze have all contributed to bringing the notion of the event to the forefront of process-relational theory. Diferences among diferent theorists aside, the notion of event can be understood as “part of an anti-reductionist project that seeks to describe the relations between actual things, bodies and happenings” (Fraser, 2006: 129). Latour and Stengers both use the notion of event as a way of thinking about science—not in terms of discovery but as an invention of sorts. In Pandora’s Hope (1999: 305), Latour says he borrows the notion of event from Whitehead as a way to avoid giving all scientific credit to human discoverers, at the expense of objects that typically remain immobile. Similarly, Stengers (2000) conceptualized science as event in the sense that it invents new relations between facts and fiction. In problematizing accepted boundaries, science becomes political in Stengers’ account. An entirely diferent way of conceptualizing the event can be found in Alain Badiou’s thinking, which, in many ways, is exactly the opposite of how process-relational philosophers conceptualize the event. For Badiou (2005), events are not premised on contingency but, rather, on a radical break with the past. For more on the notion of event in recent philosophical theory, see Fraser (2006) and Mackenzie (2005).\n\n15. By “diferent,” I do not necessarily mean “all new” or “radically disparate” from how things were before. My intention is not to talk about before and after at all, but to examine how boundaries and relations are enacted in practice. As I hope should be clear by now, I do not mean to suggest that the algorithm causes all of this to happen on its own or to anthropomorphize the algorithm. To remind readers, any distinction is analytical only, and made with the recognition that these entities necessarily entail each other in practice.\n\n16. The notion of the pharmakon I take from Bernhard Stiegler’s (2012; 2013) work, where he uses this Greek concept to talk about various technologies as both poison and cure.\n\nChapter 7\n\n1. Wendy Chun (2016) argues that it is through habits that new media become embedded in our lives. It is not the push to the future characteristic of Big Data that structures lives in the age of smartphones and “new” media, but rather habitual forms of updating, streaming, sharing etc.   \n2. See also Gillespie (2017); Grimmelmann, J. (2008).\n\n3. A widely used example of platform intervention is how Google responded diferently in two cases of “Google bombing,” the practice of manipulating Google’s algorithms to get a piece of content to the top of the search results for a given topic. While Google chose to intervene and to manually “clean up” its search results when a group of people started a racist campaign against Michelle Obama in 2009 (to make search results for her name yield images of a monkey), the company did not intervene when in the wake of the 2011 terrorist atacks in Norway a campaign was launched urging people to upload pictures of dog droppings, tagging them with the terrorist’s name.\n\n4. Claims about heterogeneity and relationality do not automatically imply symmetry or equality. Despite the long-time insistence on symmetries within studies of science and technology, realities are seen as enacted and made through practices. As Pickering suggests with regards to humans and nonhumans, “semiotically, these things can be made equivalent; in practice they are not” (Pickering, 1995: 15). How agency and power manifest in particular practices is therefore an empirical question.\n\n5. Here I am borrowing from Ganaele Langlois, who writes about meaning machines and how they “not tightly control what users say, but rather how they come to speak” (2013: 103).\n\n6. In Karen Barad (2007) and Donna Haraway’s (2004) terms, we might also say that the “response-ability” is shared. Accordingly, reponsibility and accountability is not so much about taking charge, as it is about the ability to respond to others.\n\n174\n\nNOTES TO PAGES 146–159","previous_page":173,"next_page":175}