{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1dc0854c-957b-4fb1-af9a-bb4fdb76b77e","title":"Time, Consumption and Everyday Life Practice, Materiality and Culture","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"1dc0854c-957b-4fb1-af9a-bb4fdb76b77e","id":"1dc0854c-957b-4fb1-af9a-bb4fdb76b77e","uuid":"1dc0854c-957b-4fb1-af9a-bb4fdb76b77e","title":"Time, Consumption and Everyday Life Practice, Materiality and Culture","normalized_title":"timeconsumptionandeverydaylifepracticematerialityandculture","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":236,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1dc0854c-957b-4fb1-af9a-bb4fdb76b77e","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Time%2C%20Consumption%20and%20Everyday%20Life%20Practice%2C%20Materiality%20and%20Culture","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/1dc0854c-957b-4fb1-af9a-bb4fdb76b77e/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/1dc0854c-957b-4fb1-af9a-bb4fdb76b77e/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/1dc0854c-957b-4fb1-af9a-bb4fdb76b77e","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1dc0854c-957b-4fb1-af9a-bb4fdb76b77e/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/1dc0854c-957b-4fb1-af9a-bb4fdb76b77e/search"},"page":{"printed_page":37,"pdf_page":42,"physical_index":42,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"3defd993de3339417f9e19dd07d29d1c32499a70a724dd7854629038764cb7e2"},"chapter":"List of Tables and Figures","content":"The temporal component of timespace is less familiar. Perhaps it will help clarify matters if I explain that my conception of this temporal component is heir to a tradition, beginning with Augustine, that affirms the idea of a human time. Twentieth-century notions of time that stand in this tradition include experiential time, lived time, existential time and the time of consciousness. My own conception of such a time derives from Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962).\n\n‘Existential temporality’, as Heidegger called it, is not succession. It does not consist in before and after orderings of events, instants or anything else. It is characterized, instead, by dimensionality, that is, by past, present and future. More specifically, existential temporality is the past, present and future of human existence. For present purposes, existence can be understood as human activity. Existential temporality is, thus, the past, present and future dimensions of human activity. Of course, past, present and future also characterize events (or instants): events belong to the present, past or future according to whether they are, are no more or are not yet. As dimensions of human activity, however, past, present and future do not order events or anything else. Rather, they are features of activity. As features of activity, moreover, they are so long as a person acts: the three dimensions of temporality occur simultaneously, ‘at one stroke’, as Bergson (1911: 309) put it. In this, the past, present and future of activity differ from past, present and future events. Past events are no more, while future events are not yet; only present events are. By contrast, the three dimensions of activity are and occur together so long as a person acts. If activity ceases, the three disappear together.\n\nHeidegger famously analysed human existence as being-in-the-world, which he interpreted more expansively as projecting, thrown being-amid entities. Projection, thrownness and being-amid are, respectively, the future, past and present dimensions of human activity. Projection is acting for the sake of a way of being or state of affairs. Most of the time a person acts for the sake of something, and in doing so she comes towards that thing. This coming towards is the future dimension of her activity. Thrownness, meanwhile, is being situated. When a person acts, she almost always responds to or acts in the light of particular states of affairs. These states of affairs are that given which she does whatever she does. This departing, or coming, from particular states of affairs in acting is the past dimension of activity. Being-amid, finally, is having to do with entities: acting amid, towards and at (bei) them. It is the present dimension of activity, activity itself. In sum, a person, when acting, comes towards a way of being departing from certain states of affairs. This acting–coming towards–departing from is the temporal structure of activity.\n\nTimespace and the Organization of Social Life\n\n37","previous_page":36,"next_page":38}