{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"231a69de-8526-4d34-8fa7-231b09af93a8","title":"技术体系：理性的社会生活","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787552024104","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"231a69de-8526-4d34-8fa7-231b09af93a8","id":"231a69de-8526-4d34-8fa7-231b09af93a8","uuid":"231a69de-8526-4d34-8fa7-231b09af93a8","title":"技术体系：理性的社会生活","normalized_title":"技术体系理性的社会生活","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787552024104","isbns":["9787552024104"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":328,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/231a69de-8526-4d34-8fa7-231b09af93a8","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF%E4%BD%93%E7%B3%BB%EF%BC%9A%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E7%94%9F%E6%B4%BB","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/231a69de-8526-4d34-8fa7-231b09af93a8/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/231a69de-8526-4d34-8fa7-231b09af93a8/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/231a69de-8526-4d34-8fa7-231b09af93a8","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/231a69de-8526-4d34-8fa7-231b09af93a8/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/231a69de-8526-4d34-8fa7-231b09af93a8/search"},"page":{"printed_page":206,"pdf_page":222,"physical_index":222,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"6a9bf20e7a25ac9a19f75a4ea60f8c430b434973b53f82ba0e9c45a7bb4a1414"},"chapter":"第六章批判建构主义中的功能概念","content":"早期海德格尔的技术功能和世界\n\n海德格尔发展了两个技术人造物理论，早期理论基于技艺，后期理论关注现代技术。表述在《存在与时间》中的早期理论是对日常技术生活世界的现象学研究。海德格尔的“世界”一词意味着一个有意义实体的体系，该体系可追溯到能够解释环境、斟酌目的并且行动的能动者。这种现象学的世界概念应该与日常的、自然主义的概念区分开。这是因为这个概念预设了意义与意向性，“世界”不像日常理解的那样是所有实体的总和，也不是自然科学所理解的宇宙论的研究对象。日常和科学将海德格尔称为“世界”的东西看成是一个主观性质的体系，其中并无本体论意义。然而，海德格尔把他所理解的世界当成是本体论层面上的基础概念，并宣称日常和自然科学的理解都建立在这个基础概念之上。\n\n海德格尔的世界概念是一种“生存论性质”(existentiale)，即亚里士多德意义上的“范畴”，而不是人类存在的一个范畴。这种范畴的普遍性忽略任何特殊的文化界限，以人类与其所是的关系来定义人类。一般被称为文化的东西被当作另一种生存论性质入场，被称为dasMan，即“常人”。该词的语言学游戏的含义很简单：常人说了文化中所有明显的具有确定性的东西，因而无法被归属于任何特殊的个人。\n\n206\n\n技术体系：理性的社会生活","previous_page":205,"next_page":null}