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Bratton","content":"12. See David Kusner, “ The Real Story of Stuxnet, ” IEEE Spectrum, February 23, 2013, http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet.\n\n13. As well as simulations of all of these, as evidenced by the imaginary ISIS attack on Louisiana as invented by Russian mischief makers. See Cory Doctorow, “ Imaginary ISIS Attack on Louisiana and the Twitterbots Who Loved It, ” http://boingboing.net/2015/03/08/imaginary-isis-attack -on-louis.html.\n\n14. The shock and awe of military/entertainment programs is by no means exclusive to airports, but as an urban type, they are perhaps most decisively dependent on its effects. On the one hand, the airport is a liminal space of territorial and jurisdictional transition, and so available to exceptional policing actions. On the other, airport urbanism is the absolutely normal essence of what the City layer is and does, and because of this symbolic miniaturization of the world at large, it is so useful as a target for political violence (and so available to exceptional policing actions).\n\n15. The Foucauldian disciplinary model describes a mode of spatial power predicated on the securing of subjects in place (securing a negative freedom of movement and a positive freedom from movement).\n\n16. The problematics and potential of the urban operating system are well articulated by Matthew Fuller and Usman Haque in Urban Versioning System v.1.0, Situated Technologies Pamphlet series, 2008, http://www.situatedtechnologies.net/. The conflicts involved, however, are impossible to tally in real time. In their book Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet, Julian Assange, Jacob Appelbaum, and Andy Muller-Maguhn are alarmed that “ Siemens is marketing a platform for intelligence agencies that does actually produce automated actions. So when target A is within a certain number of meters of target B according to their mobile intercept records, and target A receives an email mentioning something — a keyword — then an action is triggered. ” For them the User-versus- Cloud arms race is tilted by the widespread use of cryptographic systems (including perhaps the Cryptophone, http://www.cryptophone.de/en/products/mobile/). One lesson from the Snowden affair was that the cryptographic and anonymizing tools (like Tor browser) may increase the likelihood that the User will be a tracked target of surveillance. See Dan Goodin, “ Use of Tor and E-mail Crypto Could Increase Chances that NSA Keeps Your Data, ” http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/06/use-of-tor-and-e-mail-crypto-could-increase -chances-that-nsa-keeps-your-data/. For one, much of the tracking involves the reconstruction of metadata about the network of Users communicating instead of the more laborious cracking of individual messages, and so encrypting only content provides no additional privacy. Second, the National Security Agency seems to have decided that Tor users, for whom an IP address cannot be confidently located within the United States, are presumed not to be US citizens, and so not covered by federal legal protection. The argument then is that only when everyone uses cryptographic and anonymizing tools their use no longer places a target on the back of those who do. See Assange, et al., Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet (New York: OR Books, 2012).\n\nNotes\n\n405","previous_page":404,"next_page":406}