{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"2619284f-c364-4de3-bdf4-82f768dbc1c5","title":"Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"2619284f-c364-4de3-bdf4-82f768dbc1c5","id":"2619284f-c364-4de3-bdf4-82f768dbc1c5","uuid":"2619284f-c364-4de3-bdf4-82f768dbc1c5","title":"Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics","normalized_title":"democracyandotherneoliberalfantasiescommunicativecapitalismandleftpolitics","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":229,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/2619284f-c364-4de3-bdf4-82f768dbc1c5","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Democracy%20and%20Other%20Neoliberal%20Fantasies%20Communicative%20Capitalism%20and%20Left%20Politics","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/2619284f-c364-4de3-bdf4-82f768dbc1c5/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/2619284f-c364-4de3-bdf4-82f768dbc1c5/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/2619284f-c364-4de3-bdf4-82f768dbc1c5","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/2619284f-c364-4de3-bdf4-82f768dbc1c5/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/2619284f-c364-4de3-bdf4-82f768dbc1c5/search"},"page":{"printed_page":136,"pdf_page":146,"physical_index":146,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"6b228519c75447f30fd473103ade4470fb78619f3dd24ea63980d40206dad888"},"chapter":"Comunicative Capitalism & Left Politics","content":"The structure of address is important for Understanding how moral authority is introduced and sustained if we accept not just that we address others when we speak, but that in some way we come to exist, as it were, in the moment of being addressed, and something about our existence proves precarious when that address fails. More emphatically, however, what binds us morally has to do with how we are addressed by others in ways that we cannot avert or avoid; this impingement by the other's address constitutes us first and foremost against our will or, perhaps put more appropriately, prior to the formation of our wil. So if we think that moral authority is about finding one's wil and standing by it, stamping one's name upon one's wil 1t may be that we miss the very mode by which moral demands are relayed. (PL, 130)\n\nMorality, then, is less a matter of a wil than of relations prior to that wil, relations that Butler con�iders in terms of the structure of address. We come to exist by being addressed. This address, and consequently our own existence, can fail or misfire. Hence, we need to attend to this structure. If we move too quickly to wilg, Butler suggests, we may fail, harm, or do violence to our relation to the other who addresses us, a relation on which depend.\n\nAddress and Condemnation\n\nButler's sustained consideration of the scene of address appears in Giving an Account of Oneself. She takes up the limits that condition our ability to give an account of ourselves, limits that include exposure, or our condition of corporeality before others (as opposed to pure interiority, say); normativity, or the way that we come into being within a set of norms that precedes us and remains indiferent to USj and the structure of address in which any account of ourselves takes place. She elaborates, moreover, the way our very foreignness to ourselves is the source of our ethical connections to others ( Giving, 84). And she ofers a conception of ethics \"based on our shared, and invariable, partial blindnesses about ourselves. The recognition that one $\\mathbf { i s } ,$ at every turn, not quite the same as how one presents oneself in the available discourse might imply, in turn, a certain patience with others that would suspend the demand that they be self-same at every moment\" ( Giving, 42-43). Insofar as we remain opaque to ourselves, we cannot demand an ·impossi<sup>b</sup>le transparency or self-knowledge from the other. We cannot expect others to know fully why they do what they do, what their motives are, and why these are their motives. The lack in what we can know about ourselves thus might be understood as the lack in what others know about themselves. Although I may often be tempted to fil in this gap with an always impossible certainty, my ability to cultivate an awareness of this lack could enable me to be more forgiving of others and perhaps even of myself. Allowing for openness, not demanding an impossible accounting from another, thereby provides a necessary emendation to theories of recognition insofar as it attends to an underlying desire to persist ( Giving, 44) .\n\n136\n\nFIVE","previous_page":135,"next_page":null}