{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","title":"现代性的哲学话语","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544715829","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","id":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","uuid":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","title":"现代性的哲学话语","normalized_title":"现代性的哲学话语","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544715829","isbns":["9787544715829"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":463,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%8E%B0%E4%BB%A3%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E5%93%B2%E5%AD%A6%E8%AF%9D%E8%AF%AD","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/search"},"page":{"printed_page":194,"pdf_page":202,"physical_index":202,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"65216b0d11b613b448e0264109ace63eaf7bcf635812c8e80af3a05348bddc8a"},"chapter":"现代性的哲学话语","content":"像所有的颠覆一样，尼采式破坏力对摇摇欲坠的形而上学大厦仍有迷惑力。①\n\n这里我想先说说我自己的观点：德里达未能摆脱主体哲学范式的束缚。他想超越海德格尔，但无法回避那种失去一切真实性要求的真理事件的疑难结构。德里达超越了海德格尔所颠覆的基础主义，但未能走出海德格尔的窠臼。而历史化的源始哲学却呈现出一个比较清晰的轮廓。对犹太教神秘主义救世思想的回忆，对《旧约》之上帝一度占有、虽被遗弃却得到很好描述的场景的记忆等，所有这些都使得德里达既没有在政治和道德层面上陷入麻木不仁，也没有在审美层面上对荷尔德林所描述的新异教徒不闻不问。\n\n2\n\n1967年，在出版《论文字学》的同时，德里达发表文章，批判胡塞尔的意义理论。②通过这一文本，我们可以看得很清楚，德里达是如何逐步开始打破主体哲学的。就解构意识哲学的策略而言，德里达的最佳选择是《逻辑研究》第二卷《表述与意义》(Ausdruck und Bedeutung')一章。①因为在这一章，胡塞尔极力捍卫纯粹意识领域，反对语言交流的中介领域。而且，胡塞尔断然认为，意义属于理想的本质和知性领域，其目的是要消除语言表达的经验成分；而离开语言表达，我们又将无法把握意义。\n\n① 《论文字学》，第37页。\n\n② 德里达：《声音与现象》(Die Stimme und das Phänomen)，Frankfurt amMain,1979;也请参阅其论文：《形式与欲言语言：现象学笔记》(La Forme et levoulour-dire. Note sur la phenomenology du language'),《国际哲学杂志》(Rev. int .philos.),LXXXI,1967;此文收人《声音与现象》英译本(Evanston,1973)。\n\n194","previous_page":193,"next_page":195}