{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","title":"现代性的哲学话语","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544715829","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","id":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","uuid":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","title":"现代性的哲学话语","normalized_title":"现代性的哲学话语","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544715829","isbns":["9787544715829"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":463,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%8E%B0%E4%BB%A3%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E5%93%B2%E5%AD%A6%E8%AF%9D%E8%AF%AD","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/search"},"page":{"printed_page":310,"pdf_page":318,"physical_index":318,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ecdf73fd671bcaba4ff29a8302915461e961ea6f91c0cd98958558765f45e4c3"},"chapter":"现代性的哲学话语","content":"次又一次地落入了实证主义。①\n\n福科在自我设定的第二种维度上揭示出了同样的辩证关系。从费希特开始，作为反思主体的自我具有双重经验：一方面，在世界中总是作为偶然出现的事物，作为不透明的事物。另一方面，又恰好是通过这种反思而使得自在之物变得透明起来，并将它提高到“自为”的意识高度。从黑格尔经弗洛伊德再到胡塞尔，他们都试图把给定事物的自我意识过程向前推进一步，并寻找到方法论的起点，使得拒绝意识而坚持作为一种外在事物的东西通过反思变得不再陌生和透明起来：要么是肉体，要么是需求本性；要么是劳动，要么是语言。按照弗洛伊德的要求，自我必然源于他我；胡塞尔为纯粹现象学所设定的目标是：阐明并有意识地掌握一切纯粹内在性、先在性、积淀性、非现实性一一句话，主体的隐蔽基础。这些狂妄的尝试都是要从无意识的背景中摆脱出来，然而，它们都陷入了追求自我透明的乌托邦，并进而陷入了虚无主义和极端怀疑主义。\n\n试图回避第三种双重性——同时作为源始的创造主体和远离源始的主体，最终带来的是同样的辩证关系。人把自己看作是历史的产物，而历史非常悠久，一直可以追溯到远古时期；面对历史，人无能为力，尽管历史本身表明，具有创造力的人是历史的缔造者。现代思想越是竭力追寻源始，源始就越是后退到现代思想够不着的地方。“具有悖论色彩的是，前进的方向正是后退的方向，而且越陷越深。”一方面，从谢林经马克思到卢卡奇的历史哲学对此做出了回答，而且使用的都是一种发迹者从他乡回家的思想结构，一种精神领域里的奥德赛故事；另一方面，从荷尔德林经尼采到海德格尔的酒神思想则用不断隐遁的上帝的观念对此做出了回应：“他在隐遁过程中把源始揭示了出来”。①但这些狂妄的历史观念只能以恐怖、自我控制和奴役的形式付诸实践，因为它们依靠的是错误的末世论冲动。\n\n① 由此也可以看出，实在论在分析哲学中为何会保持着强大的生命力，而且是在面对身一心难题的情况下。\n\n310","previous_page":309,"next_page":311}