{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","title":"现代性的哲学话语","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544715829","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","id":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","uuid":"296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","title":"现代性的哲学话语","normalized_title":"现代性的哲学话语","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544715829","isbns":["9787544715829"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":463,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%8E%B0%E4%BB%A3%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E5%93%B2%E5%AD%A6%E8%AF%9D%E8%AF%AD","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/296fac69-2927-4952-8b17-011f7141a0cd/search"},"page":{"printed_page":356,"pdf_page":364,"physical_index":364,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"2981a6e1424410ce7f23dcdc575ac0ddb09eb41ae3b86acb2d73f561a0d9d478"},"chapter":"现代性的哲学话语","content":"从理性历史来看，青年马克思的实践哲学的意义在于把黑格尔的分裂模式同把理性的他者囊括在自身之中的理性概念分离了开来。实践哲学的理性被认为是有限的；但它仍然以一种社会批判理论的形式，与一种包容理性保持联系，因为它知道不超越它们是不行的；不超越它们，就无法认清资产阶级交往形式中体现出来的以主体为中心的理性的历史局限性。凡是顽固坚持排斥模式的人，都会对黑格尔上述认识视而不见，而从马克思那里我们可以看到，黑格尔的上述认识无需付出把精神绝对化的代价。从这一有限的视角出发，后黑格尔主义理论从一开始就接受了黑格尔的缺陷，而且影响深远：\n\n直到理性的工具性、压抑性和狭隘性遭到批判的时候，依然还在发挥作用：在霍克海默和阿多诺那里还有着影响。他们的批判总是打着一种更高理性的旗号，即包容性理性的旗号，这种理性许诺可以提出总体性要求，而总体性要求在现实理性身上是值得怀疑的。并不存在什么包容性理性。我们应该从弗洛伊德或尼采那里汲取教训，认识到理性离开他者便无法存在，而且，就功能上说，正是因为有了他者，理性才必不可少。①\n\n伯麦兄弟的上述这段话让我们联想到，尼采曾根据浪漫派的遗产，用总体化的理性批判来对抗具有辩证风格的启蒙纲领。只有当理性被剥夺掉一切先验力量，只有当理性始终处于疯狂的自主状态和无能状态，到了康德为知性和理智状态所划定的极限，启蒙辩证法才会失去其意义：\n\n① 《理性的他者》，第18页。\n\n356","previous_page":355,"next_page":357}