{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","title":"Zombie Capitalism Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781608461042","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","id":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","uuid":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","title":"Zombie Capitalism Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx","normalized_title":"zombiecapitalismglobalcrisisandtherelevanceofmarx","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781608461042","isbns":["9781608461042"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":426,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Zombie%20Capitalism%20Global%20Crisis%20and%20the%20Relevance%20of%20Marx","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/search"},"page":{"printed_page":178,"pdf_page":178,"physical_index":178,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"7268f13883dc32bf6d8ae498ca80e0c0e396bd38346c718e6badf839ab49efb8"},"chapter":"Zombie Capitalism Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx","content":"The Yugoslav Branko Horvat was able to publish a book called Business Cycles in Yugoslavia49 which pointed out that even before the market reforms of 1968 the Yugoslav economy was \"significantly more unstable\" than ten other economies that were cited, \"including the United States\" . A Western academic showed that such unevenness was already visible in the Soviet Union from the time of the first Five Year plan onwards.50\n\nThe pattern of unevenness showed great similarities with the Western capitalist states during the long boom. Its origin lay in the dynamics of competitive accumulation. As we saw in Chapter Three, at a certain point in any boom the competitive drive of capitalists to invest leads to a drying up of existing supplies of raw materials, labour and loanable capital (ie non-invested surplus value). The prices of all these things-commodity prices, money wages and interest rates-begin to rise until the least profitable firms suddenly find they are operating at a loss. Some go out of business. Others survive, but only by abandoning planned investments and closing down factories. Their actions in turn destroy markets for other capitals, forcing them to abandon investments and close down factories. The \"excess demand\" of the boom gives rise to the overproduction of the slump. The secret of the Western long boom of the 1940s, 1 950s and 1960s lay in the way the national state could reduce the pressures leading to over-accumulation (by diverting a portion of capital into non-productive military channels); take direct action to try to maintain a high rate of exploitation (through wage controls); intervene to slow down the boom before it led key firms to become unprofitable; and maintain a minimum guaranteed level of demand through military orders. The state monopoly capitalist arms economy was not able to do away with the cyclical pattern of capitalist accumulation. Specifically, it could not stop competitive pressures causing capitalists to tend to expand production during upturns in the economy on a scale which exceeded the available resources. But it was able to prevent such spells of \"over-accumulation\" leading to slumps of the pre-Second World War sort.\n\nSomething of the same pattern existed in the Soviet-type economies. Bottlenecks arose throughout the economy, threatening the closure of vast sectors of production through shortages of inputs. Output never rose nearly as rapidly as planned. The monetary funds paid out by enterprises for materials and labour exceeded the output of the economy, giving rise to inflationary pressures which found direct expression as price rises or \"hidden\" expression as acute shortages of goods in the shops.\n\n178\n\nCapitalism in the 20th Century","previous_page":177,"next_page":179}