{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","title":"Zombie Capitalism Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781608461042","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","id":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","uuid":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","title":"Zombie Capitalism Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx","normalized_title":"zombiecapitalismglobalcrisisandtherelevanceofmarx","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781608461042","isbns":["9781608461042"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":426,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Zombie%20Capitalism%20Global%20Crisis%20and%20the%20Relevance%20of%20Marx","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/search"},"page":{"printed_page":239,"pdf_page":239,"physical_index":239,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"447f9be0fd986d6d07e9ca2dbce496f21fcf5daa9e09efc95ce23d05bcc95ec6"},"chapter":"Zombie Capitalism Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx","content":"Annual hours worked per worker, 2004<sup>30</sup>\n\nEuropean capital found itself facing problems it had not faced in the years of the boom or even in the decade and a half after it collapsed. Output per head in what is now the Eurozone had grown from 40 percent of the US figure in 1950 to 75 percent in 1975, and German growth, like that of Japan, exceeded that of the US in the 1980s. In 1990 German unification was expected to provide a further massive boost. The mood by the beginning of the new millennium was very different. Overall productivity levels had long since stopped catching up with the US. Those challenging the US auto industry on its home ground were Japanese transplant plants, not Volkswagen and Fiat. Japan may have lost out to the US in computers, but at least it had a computer industry while Europe did not. And coming up on the outside in the inter-capitalist race was China. \"Europe needs to wake up\" was the message pumped out by scores of Euro think tanks, endorsed by centre-left and centre-right politicians alike and inscribed in the Lisbon Declaration of European leaders in 2002.\n\nThe picture for European capitalism was not as dire as that message sometimes made out. Germany, not China, was still the world's biggest exporter in 2006 and its manufacturing industry's output had grown rapidly, even if its employment had not. The EADS airbus consortium was able to compete with Boeing in a way that the Japanese aerospace industry could not. Spanish and French firms had gobbled up many of Latin America's banks, and the European Union sold and invested slightly more in the Mercosur region of that continent than did the US. And for the moment Chinese imports only amounted to 1 percent of European GDP.\n\nThe Years of Delusion\n\n239","previous_page":238,"next_page":240}