{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","title":"Zombie Capitalism Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781608461042","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","id":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","uuid":"4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","title":"Zombie Capitalism Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx","normalized_title":"zombiecapitalismglobalcrisisandtherelevanceofmarx","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781608461042","isbns":["9781608461042"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":426,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Zombie%20Capitalism%20Global%20Crisis%20and%20the%20Relevance%20of%20Marx","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4a3d22bd-c5b9-47a4-a022-bd35d44d9bfe/search"},"page":{"printed_page":283,"pdf_page":283,"physical_index":283,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"cf1d30e84829245e14ba735fdb80d58dd2867b865667b3b1ab55d5df31f778c7"},"chapter":"Zombie Capitalism Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx","content":"Globally this meant there was a growing pool of growth of money capital-money in the hands of productive as well as nonproductive capitals-searching for outlets that seemed to promise higher levels of profitability. Hence the pressure on firms to deliver short-term rather than long-term profits. So too the succession of speculative bubbles and the repeated \"Minsky\" shifts from speculation to Ponzi schemes in which financiers used the money entrusted to them by some investors to pay off other investors and line their own pockets.15 All sorts of speculative, unproductive activities flourished, from pouring money into stock markets or real estate to buying oil paintings by old masters. In each case, the rush of speculators into buying things in the expectation of rising prices was, for a time, a self-fulfilling prophecy. As they outbid each other, prices did indeed rise. In this way the ups and downs of the productive part of the system found a magnified reflection in the ups and downs of various other assets. The financial system expanded as a consequence, since it played a key part in collecting together the funds for speculation, and could then use the assets whose value had increased because of speculation as collateral for borrowing more funds.\n\nThere developed a mass of capital wandering round the world looking for any opportunity where it seemed there might be profits to be made. Already in the economic recovery of the late 1980s:\n\nFinancial activity became frenetic, with stock and share and property values soaring upwards . . . Property speculation rose to new heights, and private borrowing reached record levels in the US, Britain, and Japan . . . There was real industrial growth, but it was dwarfed by the expansion of the property markets and by various forms of speculative activity . . . General business investment grew considerably faster than manufacturing investment-in sharp contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s, when manufacturing grew at the same speed. The growth of manufacturing investment was about a third lower in the US and Japan, and about two thirds lower in Europe, than in the earlier period. 16\n\nRobert Boyer and Michael Aglietta have accurately described what happened during the next US boom, in the mid and later 1990s:\n\nOverall demand and supply are driven by asset price expectations, which create the possibility of a self-fulfilling virtuous circle. In the global economy, high expectations of profits trigger an increase in asset prices which foster a boost in consumer demand, which in turn validates the profit expectations . . . One is left with the impression that the wealth-induced growth regime rests upon the expectation of an endless asset-price ap-<sup>17</sup>prec1at10n . . .\n\nFinancialisation and the Bubbles That Burst\n\n283","previous_page":282,"next_page":284}