{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4bd1f0d7-8363-46b4-a5b5-0c3ef555a01d","title":"分裂分析德勒兹 先验经验论与建构主义","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4bd1f0d7-8363-46b4-a5b5-0c3ef555a01d","id":"4bd1f0d7-8363-46b4-a5b5-0c3ef555a01d","uuid":"4bd1f0d7-8363-46b4-a5b5-0c3ef555a01d","title":"分裂分析德勒兹 先验经验论与建构主义","normalized_title":"分裂分析德勒兹先验经验论与建构主义","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":327,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4bd1f0d7-8363-46b4-a5b5-0c3ef555a01d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%88%86%E8%A3%82%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9%20%E5%85%88%E9%AA%8C%E7%BB%8F%E9%AA%8C%E8%AE%BA%E4%B8%8E%E5%BB%BA%E6%9E%84%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4bd1f0d7-8363-46b4-a5b5-0c3ef555a01d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4bd1f0d7-8363-46b4-a5b5-0c3ef555a01d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4bd1f0d7-8363-46b4-a5b5-0c3ef555a01d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4bd1f0d7-8363-46b4-a5b5-0c3ef555a01d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4bd1f0d7-8363-46b4-a5b5-0c3ef555a01d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":64,"pdf_page":95,"physical_index":95,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"932e17327f26e17c5134af1c0948f6d4d92fd3441810394c88df01d2f0bcab9c"},"chapter":"第一章 时间","content":"影像长久以来总是寓涵某种柏拉图主义，总是离不开再现体制，除了在贬抑的状态下(拟像)，影像无法独立存在，因为它必然是一种从属与再现，假设了一个既存的“的”：一切影像都已是“的影像”(image-de)，自在影像因而是不可理解的。影像的历史于是便是一部再现史，而思想则在这部历史中化约为再现的操作，这是德勒兹从《尼采与哲学》(1962)经《差异与重复》(1968)到《意义的逻辑》(1969)对同一性所展现的批判立场。然而，影像是否注定得以再现的形式被构思呢?它是否总是必须附庸于同一性思想呢?或者反过来问，影像是否可以脱离与再现体制的关系，成为差异思考的对象呢？一种非再现影像是否可能?可以展现何种形上学意涵?如果影像概念纠缠整个德勒兹哲学而且最终使他写出了两巨册的影像论述1]，原因之一恐怕在于影像概念已经成为差异哲学不得不面对的问题。一方面，影像及其代表的再现思想(思想的教条影像[2])在早期德勒兹著作中是同一性的主要特征，明确对立于大写差异或大写思想，以致德勒兹甚至激进地指出真正的差异思想必然是一种“无影像思想”[3]；然而另一方面，随着存在模式与影像愈来愈密切的关联(特别是在电影被发明之后)，柏拉图式的再现影像已不足以说明当前所感知的多样化影像类型，如何构思一种“另类于”再现体制的影像考验着差异哲学的能耐。\n\n分裂分析德勒兹\n\n[1]“思想影像……，我被这个问题所纠缠。”(PP,203-204)\n\n[3] DR, 216-217.\n\n[2]德勒兹在许多地方论述与分析了“思想的教条影像”(image dogmatique de lapensée)，主要可参阅《尼采与哲学》(Nietzsche et la philosophie, 118-126)，或《差异与重复》第三章。\n\n64","previous_page":63,"next_page":65}