{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4ec17d87-0309-41de-9bb0-d3dffb1b81da","title":"马克思的价值：当代资本主义经济学批判","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787520180269","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4ec17d87-0309-41de-9bb0-d3dffb1b81da","id":"4ec17d87-0309-41de-9bb0-d3dffb1b81da","uuid":"4ec17d87-0309-41de-9bb0-d3dffb1b81da","title":"马克思的价值：当代资本主义经济学批判","normalized_title":"马克思的价值当代资本主义经济学批判","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787520180269","isbns":["9787520180269"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":244,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4ec17d87-0309-41de-9bb0-d3dffb1b81da","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E9%A9%AC%E5%85%8B%E6%80%9D%E7%9A%84%E4%BB%B7%E5%80%BC%EF%BC%9A%E5%BD%93%E4%BB%A3%E8%B5%84%E6%9C%AC%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E5%AD%A6%E6%89%B9%E5%88%A4","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4ec17d87-0309-41de-9bb0-d3dffb1b81da/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4ec17d87-0309-41de-9bb0-d3dffb1b81da/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4ec17d87-0309-41de-9bb0-d3dffb1b81da","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4ec17d87-0309-41de-9bb0-d3dffb1b81da/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4ec17d87-0309-41de-9bb0-d3dffb1b81da/search"},"page":{"printed_page":33,"pdf_page":40,"physical_index":40,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ab0e37388c2d9e71e49638435bd92a632715a9b12ba55ba15031c38bf4f08178"},"chapter":"第一章 唯物辩证法","content":"黑格尔是辩证法的创建人之一，而马克思“公开承认我是这位大思想家的学生”。①虽然敬佩黑格尔，但马克思仍给黑格尔以沉重的抨击。\n\n我的辩证方法，从根本上来说，不仅和黑格尔的辩证方法不同，而且和它截然相反。在黑格尔看来，思维过程，即甚至被他在观念这一名称下转化为独立主体的思维过程，是现实事物的创造主，而现实事物只是思维过程的外部表现。我的看法则相反，观念的东西不外是移入人的头脑并在人的头脑中改造过的物质的东西而已……在他那里，辩证法是倒立着的。必须把它倒过来，以便发现神秘外壳中的合理内核。②\n\n黑格尔的体系是唯心主义的。第一，对他而言，概念的存在不依赖于物质环境（或者说不依赖于具体中的真实关系），尤其是，具体的普遍\n\n仅仅作为一个概念而存在，仅仅存在于思想中，绝不存在于“外部现实”中。因此，黑格尔相信唯物主义不可能是哲学（因为哲学是关于普遍的科学，对黑格尔来说，普遍的\n\n第一章 唯物辩证法\n\n① 参见Capital1（pp.102-103)。\n\n② 同上。这里的批判是在重复以前的著作，例如：“黑格尔陷入幻觉，把实在理解为自我综合、自我深化和自我运动的思维的结果。”(Grundrisse，p.101)又或者“重要的是黑格尔在任何地方都把观念当作主体，而把本来意义上的现实的主体，例如，‘政治信念’变成谓语”(Marx1975，p.65)；还可以参见pp.61-73，80-82，98-100。T.Smith（1993a，Pp.47，76-77)论证，马克思误读了黑格尔。Rosenthal（1997）花大力气证明了T.Smith的主张不正确。Bradby(1982，pp.131-132)对黑格尔式马克思主义的神秘方面提出了尖锐的批评。\n\n33","previous_page":32,"next_page":34}