{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","uuid":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","normalized_title":"bodiesincodeinterfaceswithdigitalmedia","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","isbns":["0415970164","0415970156","9780415970167","9780415970150"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":348,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Bodies%20in%20code%20%20interfaces%20with%20digital%20media","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/search"},"page":{"printed_page":185,"pdf_page":198,"physical_index":198,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"6e3d69c39af6bb868caf305526dda085884d0bca9f81b3eab0ae7a09be976587"},"chapter":"bodies in code","content":"With this conception of space animated by the projections of the body-and not simply those which the body specifically perceives and intends, Arakawa and Gins expand the affective body beyond the bounds of Henri Bergson's seminal account. Bergson argued that perception, rather than being a spiritual activity that added something to the material world, was in actuality a result of material diminution: the subtraction, from the universe of images, of precisely those that are relevant to a particular body or “center of indetermination.\" According to Bergson, this subtraction is necessarily informed by the affection of the body, such that there can be no perception without affection.i Yet, although Bergson understood affection to be a bodily correlate necessarily accompanying any act of perception, the affection of space by the body—and specifically by the body's imaging capability or imaging landing sites—projects affectivity beyond the physical-physiological confines of the body.\n\nSuch a projection yields what Bernard Cache (following Husserl) has called the “longitudinal\" dimension of embodied perception:\n\nPerception consists of two parts that could be called frontal and logitudinal. The frontality of perceived images would result from their action being suspended with respect to us; from the break between their solicitation and our reaction—an interval between our automatisms. The second part would then be longitudinal as we constantly expose ourselves to out-of-body images in order to always redefine the present of our perception or the variable horizon of our contractile body. According to the frontal component, we see clear articulations drawn between the objects that solicit the reactions of our solid body; while longitudinally, each of these images continually interacts with the others and with us, as in a test of resonance. For we must produce the tone of our present in order to adjust the horizon of our contractile body and find the right pitch. Unlike the great frontal articulations, our longitudinal perception constantly folds and rubs the fabric of images against itself, thus allowing the texture of things to emerge. (147)\n\nWith this beautiful image of a perceiving body nurtured by the rich texture of images surrounding it, Cache expresses the importance of a tactile and affective background to perception. As he sees it, perception cannot merely designate the virtual action of the body upon things, as if it existed in a vacuum, but must also somehow integrate the larger \"milieu\" of interactions within which the body necessarily finds itself located and which it experiences more as a tactile than a visual sensation.ii Accordingly, the body's capacity to act is never simply a property it possesses in isolation; it is always a recursive and constantly modulated function of its embeddedness within a rich “texture of sensation.'\n\nWEARABLE SPACE\n\n185","previous_page":184,"next_page":186}