{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","uuid":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","normalized_title":"bodiesincodeinterfaceswithdigitalmedia","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","isbns":["0415970164","0415970156","9780415970167","9780415970150"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":348,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Bodies%20in%20code%20%20interfaces%20with%20digital%20media","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/search"},"page":{"printed_page":255,"pdf_page":268,"physical_index":268,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ae28c862b51b571fafd73f8cc6afa3d9ac84cfec44bee41cbafe9df70d254ca5"},"chapter":"bodies in code","content":"In effect, Maturana and Varela distinguish two types of observation: one in which the autopoiesis complements the organism because it adopts the perspective of the organism and another that is allopoietic because it adopts a perspective external to the organism. Thus, to treat an autopoietic machine as autopoietic (and not as allopoietic), an observer must distinguish system from environment in a manner which coincides with the system's self-specified boundaries. Obviously, this necessarily also holds for the system observing itself.\n\nxiii. I analyze this technophobia—the reduction of technology to a figure of thinking—at length in Embodying Technesis: Technology beyond Writing. The critique of Western metaphysical discourse for reducing technology lies at the heart of Stiegler's multivolume Technics and Time project (see volume 1, cited earlier).\n\nxiv. I say \"in the final instance\" because Butler does as much as is possible to think the materialization of the body—that is, to think agency as materialization. Perhaps we could say that Butler's theory of gender performativity is the constructivist theory least guilty of externalism, with the important point being that it still is externalist. As I see it now, the commitment to externalism is a consequence of Butler's adherence to the Hegelian-Lacanian tradition of selfrecognition, which privileges the visual and the objectifying role of the gaze. In this sense, my effort to develop a theory of embodiment using the resources of autopoietic theory (specifically, the privilege of the operational perspective) can be seen as an effort to counter the Lacanian hold (which is exercised even in the case of a critic, like Butler, who is otherwise critical) on thinking identity in our world today.\n\nxv. \"Without fragility, the body not only loses its sensibility, but also its capacity to apprehend the other in its own body. An infallible body is not only the translation of an omnipotence without default, it is perhaps also the refusal of the other in its specificity\" (41).\n\nxvi. Hayles, for instance, includes the instrumentalization of the body as the \"first medium\" as one of the four leitmotifs of the posthuman. See Hayles 1999, Introduction.\n\nxvii. See Varela, \"Organism: A Meshwork of Selfless Selves,\" (Varela 1991), for a delineation of the five primary levels of \"selfhood.\" The term \"individuation\" comes from Gilbert Simondon, as does the concept of \"excess\"; Simondon's theory of individuation and of the preindividual basis for individuation as an ongoing process cosubstantial with living will become important for my analysis in Chapter 1.\n\nNOTES\n\n255","previous_page":254,"next_page":256}