{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","uuid":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","normalized_title":"bodiesincodeinterfaceswithdigitalmedia","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","isbns":["0415970164","0415970156","9780415970167","9780415970150"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":348,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Bodies%20in%20code%20%20interfaces%20with%20digital%20media","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/search"},"page":{"printed_page":48,"pdf_page":61,"physical_index":61,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ad2ff80b998a307a690c5c79f571d279d44606a34846cfe16290c6fc8d3e0060"},"chapter":"bodies in code","content":"vision of technics central to Merleau-Ponty's embodied phenomenology. Whereas the blind man's stick merely extends the spatial range of the body schema (and of the motor intentionality it yields), Traces fundamentally redeploys the body schema—that is, the temporality of embodied enaction—toward the purpose of creating a world out of the primary data of bodily motility.\n\nTraces thereby reveals that the power of the body schema to disclose a world—and along with it, the entire ontological register of the \"phenomenal\" body with its privileged operational standpoint and orientation via proprioception and intermodal communication—is a temporal power, or better, a power that can be exercised only within certain temporal boundaries. Because temporal boundaries are necessarily set into place by artifactual technologies—by those technologies that support the being in the world of time today, including the time of consciousness—Traces demonstrates that the disclosive power of the body schema is an essentially technical power, that it simply cannot be dissociated from or thought independently of its concrete technical support, and that, in the end, it emerges only through the technology that makes it possible in the first place.\n\nObviously, such a general condition for the technical (re)deployment of the body schema calls for a more radical thinking of technics than we find in Merleau-Ponty's vision of prosthetics in the Phenomenology. Perhaps the best way to capture what is at stake here is to return, briefly, to the relation (and differences) between body image and body schema. Once again, Shaun Gallagher proves an insightful guide insofar as he manages to explain how prosthetics function to disjoin the unconscious body schema from any consciously experienced, intended (or noetic) body image.\n\nWhen the body does appear in consciousness, it often appears as clearly differentiated from its environment. Body image boundaries tend to be relatively clearly defined. The body schema, in contrast can be functionally integrated with its environment, even to the extent that it frequently incorporates certain objects into its operations—the hammer in the carpenter's hand, the feather in the woman's hat, and so forth. Under these circumstances one's perception of body boundary may end at one's finger tips even when a particular schema projects itself to include the hammer that one is using. (Gallagher and Cole, 372)\n\nIt is interesting that this perceptual differentiation between self-representation (body image) and enactive spatialization (body schema) can no longer be made in virtual environments like that of Penny's Traces. The reason is not simply that the prosthetic function is so fundamental that it has an impact on the visual or representational body image as well as the motile body schema,x but rather that the difference between them—and with it, the role of representation—has been entirely effaced. Put another way, in such environments, whatever experience one has of one's body proper does not take the form of a (representational) image, but rather emerges through the representative function of the data of body movement, the way these data (“naturally, as it were) represent one's body.\n\nBODIES IN CODE\n\n48","previous_page":47,"next_page":49}