{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","uuid":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","normalized_title":"bodiesincodeinterfaceswithdigitalmedia","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","isbns":["0415970164","0415970156","9780415970167","9780415970150"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":348,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Bodies%20in%20code%20%20interfaces%20with%20digital%20media","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/search"},"page":{"printed_page":51,"pdf_page":64,"physical_index":64,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"9159c2c972a271d94a42b8a675b1d6a3505a6b718b82afb534686f545a2a7e8c"},"chapter":"bodies in code","content":"This characterization of the body image as an emanation (along with the differentiation of image and schema it supports and derives specifically from Merleau-Ponty) helps to clarify Paul Schilder's claim that we perceive our body image in the same way as others perceive it. For Schilder (the psychologist par excellence of the body image and the source for much of Merleau-Ponty's analysis), this is almost an analytical postulate, insofar as it is (or seemed to him to be) necessary to ward off the specter of Einfühlung and projective identification:\n\nThe perception of the bodies of others and of their expression of emotions is as primary as the perception of our own body and its emotions and expressions. Our own body, as all the previous discussions show, in sensory perception is not different from the sensory perception of the bodies of others.... Just as we have rejected the idea of “Einfühlung\" we have to reject the idea that we arrive at the knowledge of the bodies of others and their emotions by projecting our body and our feelings into other personalities.... [T]here is a continual interchange between our own body-image and the body-image of others.12\n\nConceiving of the body image (as it is used here) as an emanation from the body schema allows us to grasp the extent of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical break with empirical psychological theory. From his perspective, the noetic, representational body image is a derivative of—an emanation from—a more primitive, prenoetic bodily activity. Although it is true that there is continual interchange between our body image and the body image of others, the reason is far more profound than Schilder imagines. Body images (to the extent they exist as separable representations) enjoy such interchange only because they are emanations of body schemas which operate in a common, intercorporeal interactional domain. The (representational) commonality of the body image is an emanation from the (enactive) commonality of the body schema.\n\nIf an appreciation of this profound structure of intercorporeality is missing from Schilder's analysis, the reason is that Schilder lacks any understanding of the operational privilege that defines the phenomenal body on Merleau-Ponty's account. For him, everything takes place at the level of observation, meaning ultimately that he lacks the resources to differentiate embodiment as an ontological operation from its representation in the form of an image. (In this respect, Schilder's theory resonates with the concept of psychasthenia that will be central in Chapter 2.) This lack explains Schilder's failure to differentiate the body image from the body schema in any principled, categorical manner, as well as the waves of confusion that have ensued as this failure was perpetuated by his successors and, in the process, gradually effaced.\n\nBODIES IN CODE\n\n51","previous_page":50,"next_page":52}