{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","uuid":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","normalized_title":"bodiesincodeinterfaceswithdigitalmedia","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","isbns":["0415970164","0415970156","9780415970167","9780415970150"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":348,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Bodies%20in%20code%20%20interfaces%20with%20digital%20media","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/search"},"page":{"printed_page":54,"pdf_page":67,"physical_index":67,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"d762d23454aad2757a25675e8be97bc45de793dbc5c9c7152ec5d4247c1c7922"},"chapter":"bodies in code","content":"The flesh is a mirror phenomenon and the mirror is an extension of my relation with my body.... To touch oneself, to see oneself, is to obtain ... a specular extract of oneself. I.e. fission of appearance and Being-a fission that already takes place in the touch (duality of the touching and the touched) and which, with the mirror (Narcissus) is only a more profound adhesion to Self.13\n\nWhat is the meaning of this primacy apparently granted touch as the originary source of the fission of Being and its \"specular extract\"? In what sense can we say that the mirror image, far from being the source of fission, rather belongs to touch, expands its originary self-belonging/ self-differentiating across an essential distance?\n\nGiven the correlation of the body schema with the later conception of the fleshx and the more general continuity it marks between the exploration of the ontological power of the “phenomenal body\" in the Phenomenology and the later, explicit turn to ontology, we would do well to explore such questions—and the apparent privilege of touch—beginning from Merleau-Ponty's analysis of child development in his seminar on \"The Child's Relations with Others.\" Merleau-Ponty's analysis in this seminar is guided by his conviction that the child's visual apprehension of her body—that is, the visual image of the body presented in the mirror, neither exhausts the child's experience of her body nor directly concerns the ontological dimension of such experience. \"The child's visual experience of his own body is,' Merleau-Ponty observes, \"altogether insignificant in relation to the kinesthetic, cenesthesic, or tactile feeling he can have of it.\"14\n\nTo explain the fact that the child nevertheless does assimilate the visual image of her body to the interoceptive image of it and also, more generally, that she “comes to identify as bodies,\" indeed as “animated ones,\" her body and the bodies of others, Merleau-Ponty invokes a certain commonality of experience that comes simply from the fact of embodiment: \"If I am a consciousness turned toward things [it would be better to say a body turned towards things, MH], I can meet in things the actions of another and find in them a meaning, because they are themes of possible activity for my own body\" (117).\n\nJust as this presupposes a \"reform\" in the notion of the psyche (which can no longer be viewed as something accessible only to myself and not seen from the outside), it also requires a reform in our conception of our body: \"If my body is to appropriate the conducts given to me visually and make them its own, it must itself be given to me not as a mass of utterly private sensations but instead by what has been called a postural' or corporeal' schema\" (117). This capacity is what Henri Wallon calls \"a postural impregnation' of my own body by the conducts I witness\". Thus, explains Merleau-Ponty:\n\nBODIES IN CODE\n\n54","previous_page":53,"next_page":55}