{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","uuid":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","normalized_title":"bodiesincodeinterfaceswithdigitalmedia","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","isbns":["0415970164","0415970156","9780415970167","9780415970150"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":348,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Bodies%20in%20code%20%20interfaces%20with%20digital%20media","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/search"},"page":{"printed_page":56,"pdf_page":69,"physical_index":69,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"3eee6565910c3856a2d231966e186deb12bc6a57fd94963436329589a90560ff"},"chapter":"bodies in code","content":"It is a problem first of understanding that the visual image of his body which he sees over there in the mirror is not himself, since he is not in the mirror but here, where he feels himself; and second, he must understand that, not being located there, in the mirror, but rather where he feels himself interoceptively, he can nonetheless be seen by an external witness at the very place at which he feels himself to be and with the same visual appearance that he has from the mirror. In short, he must displace the mirror image, bringing it from the apparent or virtual place it occupies in the depth of the mirror back to himself, whom he identifies at a distance with his interoceptive body. (1964, 129, first and last emphases added)\n\nFar from comprising a wholesale displacement of identification from the interoceptive to the specular self and from the body as a \"collection of confusedly felt impulses\" to the unified body image, the specular image rather marks the advent of a more complex self-relation, one that requires the recognition of a certain doubling of the self and compels a massive spatial extension of the body's primary tactility.xxiv The child must learn to recognize the specular image \"as being of oneself, yet not identical to oneself,\" to employ the felicitous distinction suggested by feminist philosopher Gail Weiss, and the means to do so is a bodily occupation of the visible, a “touching\" across an essential distance.15\n\nWhat is at stake in the specular image is, accordingly, less a drama of identification, as Lacan suggests, than a particular stage in a process that is, from the very beginning, defined by schism, \"fission,\" écart. Instead of marking a fundamental trauma that at once or continuously gives birth to the subject (as Lacan, Butler, and a host of feminist critics following in their wake have variously contended), the mirror stage belongs within a broader developmental trajectory and concretely instances the more fundamental experience of essential separation that Merleau-Ponty will increasingly identify with embodied (human) being With this in mind, it is important to emphasize that, far from occasioning some transcendence of primary tactility (bodily feeling), the mirror stage not only is ontologically rooted in it but also comprises a concrete valence of its power (i.e., imaging power).\n\nAlthough he insists on situating the schism of the mirror stage as an instance of a broader developmental trajectory of the phenomenal body, Merleau-Ponty is also, like Lacan, keenly attentive to the specific accomplishments, to the well-nigh existential leap, it makes possible. Yet whereas, for Lacan, the schism yields the fundamental, desire-generating alienation of the specular “I\" into the social \"I,\" for Merleau-Ponty it allows the child to enter into a space of intercorporeality: \"What is true of his own body, for the child, is also true of the other's body. The child himself feels that he is in the other's body, just as he feels himself to be in his visual image\" (134). For Merleau-Ponty, that is, the specular image and the \"gaze of the other\" belong together as an integral phenomenon. Far from occasioning paranoiac alienation, then, the specular image facilitates a vast expansion in the child's embodied agency precisely because it allows the child to enter into the space of the social and into social relations with others. Weiss explains how this happens:\n\nBODIES IN CODE\n\n56","previous_page":55,"next_page":57}