{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","uuid":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","normalized_title":"bodiesincodeinterfaceswithdigitalmedia","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","isbns":["0415970164","0415970156","9780415970167","9780415970150"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":348,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Bodies%20in%20code%20%20interfaces%20with%20digital%20media","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/search"},"page":{"printed_page":7,"pdf_page":20,"physical_index":20,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"e3954da64398953c060e56b90f7b6c7434e003050ea91acbc1231ce5472f8be7"},"chapter":"bodies in code","content":"Condensed into a single claim, Sedgwick and Frank's compelling, if massively reductive, argument runs as follows: the specification that (fill in with appropriate object domain) is \"discursively constructed\" rather than \"natural\" is precisely what constitutes theory.8 \"[T]hat specification,\" Sedgwick and Frank claim, \"is today understood to constitute anything as theory\": \"theory' has become almost simply coextensive with the claim (you can't say it often enough), it's not natural\" (513). Despite the distraction of its polemical fervor, this criticism manages to capture the thoroughgoing hostility to anything biological that literally permeated the ethos of theory—that is, of poststructuralism following its productive, if also (multiply) deformational, confrontation with homegrown feminist, race, gender, and queer theoretical enterprises.\n\nThe years following this triumph of the constructivist paradigm have witnessed several waves of further rumination on the topic of the body, fueled by “inputs” as diverse as cybercultural studies and Luhmannian sociology. Yet, despite a common concern with the limitations of the antibiological imperative of cultural constructivism and a perception that making good on this concern was part of their driving purpose, these latter-day theories of the body have to date hardly succeeded in producing a viable--not to mention widely palatable—account of the role played by biological embodiment in cultural experience, identity, and community. Leaving aside speculation on the reasons for this failure, which are no doubt complex enough to merit a study of their own, I would like instead to postulate that the shift to a mixed reality paradigm in our contemporary technoculture (that is, in our contemporary culture) brings with it an opportunity to revalue the meaning and role accorded the body within the accepted conceptual frameworks of our philosophical tradition.\n\nWith its functionalist model of perceptuomotor activation, the mixed reality paradigm exposes the primacy of what, with Merleau-Ponty, we might call motor intentionality for the constitution of \"reality.\" Although this primacy is certainly not new (indeed, it coincides, as Krueger's earlier cited claim suggests, with the proto-\"origin\" of the human as a distinct species), the specific conditions of mixed reality (namely, the fusion of the virtual and the physical) bring it to the fore with unprecedented clarity and force. Today's exemplary mixed reality situations—interrupting a meeting to get data from a digital database, comparing a two-dimensional architectural drawing with a real-time three-dimensional visualization, acquiring an image of oneself through the social prosthesis of common sense that is contemporary television—all have as their condition the abandonment of the dream of total immersion, i.e., the representationalist form of verisimilitude. Thus, they literally beg the question of their possibility: what makes the passage from one realm to another so seamless, so unnoticeable, so believable?\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n7","previous_page":6,"next_page":8}