{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","uuid":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","normalized_title":"bodiesincodeinterfaceswithdigitalmedia","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","isbns":["0415970164","0415970156","9780415970167","9780415970150"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":348,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Bodies%20in%20code%20%20interfaces%20with%20digital%20media","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/search"},"page":{"printed_page":79,"pdf_page":92,"physical_index":92,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"a689f9cbb36134d8ef85279adec50248a4c6be8a03f8a6b0bd2cc3f4c56ad089"},"chapter":"bodies in code","content":"Embodiment and technicity thus comprise two divergent, yet entirely complementary (indeed, strictly correlated) expressions of the negativity of (human) being as Merleau-Ponty understands it. If neither one is the cause of the other (which is just what transduction here means), then neither one can be understood as a fall or a contamination (or even a humanization) of the other, as traditional and (now) posthumanist accounts would, variously, have it. Indeed, they each occasion an originary form of transcendence and thus, together, furnish the (double) condition for the emergence of the human as a form of life—that is, as sensing sensible,\" that part of the flesh endowed with “Empfindbarkeit, the capacity to sense (224).\n\nAlthough the shift to vision may in fact expose the essential technicity of being in a particularly clear manner, it manifestly does not inaugurate that technicity. This is crucial if we are to grasp the correlation of embodiment and technicity in its full originity. Along with embodiment, technicity is there from the origin (which is equally to say that it inhabits primordial tactility) and, like embodiment, is a dimension of the essential specularity of the sensible being of the flesh. That is why the strict correlation of the two distinct, empirical senses of vision and touch comprises nothing other than a manifestation of this originary correlation. As a being conditioned by the transduction of embodiment and technicity, by the double écart of primordial tactility, the human is and will always remain split, inhabiting the two separate, incompossible yet superposed worlds of the tactile and the visual.\n\nOnly because humans are embodied beings are they able to conjoin these divergent worlds of sense: embodiment is the condition for a phenomenalization of being (for a form of the living) that emerges in the gap between touch and vision. Here, then, is the deep reason why we must not simply oppose touch and vision, but rather must attempt to think their transduction and, most crucially, must assume the consequences of its emergence out of the originary transduction of the écart as condition of embodiment and source for the technical.\n\nFor if vision does mark a massive expansion of exteriorization, we must remember that it does so not by breaking with touch, but rather by extending touch beyond the boundary of the skin. Likewise, if touch gives rise to interiority, it also—and for this very reason-inaugurates the relation to the outside constitutive for all exteriorization. To say that the human is split between the tactile and the visual is, in a certain sense, to say that the human is, from its origin, embodied and technical; the proto-origin of tactility and vision is the écart, the hinge or gap in which embodiment is conjoined with technicity, interiority with exteriorization.\n\nBODIES IN CODE\n\n79","previous_page":78,"next_page":80}