{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","uuid":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","normalized_title":"bodiesincodeinterfaceswithdigitalmedia","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","isbns":["0415970164","0415970156","9780415970167","9780415970150"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":348,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Bodies%20in%20code%20%20interfaces%20with%20digital%20media","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/search"},"page":{"printed_page":85,"pdf_page":98,"physical_index":98,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"64279f4cfffc74a9d66d089dcab0eb22edfa306b8846d209d88e0005ed759136"},"chapter":"bodies in code","content":"With his specific distinction between the subject and the individual within the process of human individuation, Simondon develops an account of the human as a living being constitutively in excess of itself and necessarily endowed with a collective dimension. Schematically put the subject is the individual viewed from the standpoint of its ongoing individuation (or genesis) and thus through its constitutive relation to the metastable domain of the “preindividual\"; the individual, by contrast, is the subject frozen at a specific moment of this individuation and cut off from the source of its (hetero)genesis, from the domain of potentiality.\n\nThe subject and the individual are connected via a disjunction: The subject encompasses the individual which in turn forms an element in the subject's individuation. This means that the individual and the subject exist at different levels of being and that, because they do, the subject can undergo a (relative) “disindividuation\" which, far from marking its dissolution as a subject, comprises the condition of possibility for the discovery of its latent collective dimension. With this discovery, the subject is able to resolve the tension generated by its constitutive excess over itself (experienced as affectivity) and, by putting itself in question through a confrontation with the preindividual it carries within it, can undergo a new (collective) individuation. Indeed, on Simondon's account, every psychosocial individuation requires a relative disindividuation of the already individuated beings that comprise its elements. This disindividuation is simply the condition of possibility for the nonindividuated potential (the preindividual) they each contain to be freed for a subsequent, higher order individuation. Not only does the subject perdure through these stages of individuation, but also—as one of their constitutive elements—it evolves in and through them.\n\nWhat renders Simondon's conceptualization a crucial continuation of Merleau-Ponty's excavation of the technicity of the living is his correlation of individuation with technics understood as a quasi-autonomous domain of being—what Bernard Stiegler has called “organized, inorganic matter\"—between the organic and the inorganic.25 On Simondon's account, technical objects are like living beings in that they must be understood from the perspective of their genesis or progressive individuation; yet, they differ from living beings in that, far from being given initially as concrete individuals, they only tend toward the concrete.\n\nNonetheless, by establishing that technical objects are the ever changing bearers of a genesis, Simondon accords them a certain autonomy from the human. Though never entirely separable from human evolution, their evolution occurs through relations internal to the domain of technicity and is only punctuated by human intervention. For this reason, technical objects are able to constitute a medium for the biologically and psychically individuated human being to interpenetrate nature, as Simondon claims:\n\nBODIES IN CODE\n\n85","previous_page":84,"next_page":86}